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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2010, Foxconn, one of the world’s largest 
electronics producing companies located in China, threw a 
seemingly inconspicuous parade for its employees as part of an 
effort to ‘boost’ their morale.1 Prior to the parade, at least nine 

1. See Tom Randall, Inside Apple’s Foxconn Factories, BLOOMBERG slide 3 (Mar. 30, 
2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/slideshow/2012-03-30/inside-apple-s-
foxconn-factory.html (depicting the employee parade at Foxconn’s Longhua campus); 
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Foxconn employees had committed suicide within a span of 
three months.2 In fact, since 2007, some sources have reported 
that at least seventeen Foxconn employees have committed or 
attempted to commit suicide.3 
Since reports of these suicides went public, Foxconn 
became the subject of multiple exposés and investigations 
looking at the inner workings of their factories.4 A majority of 
the reports have found that the combination of excessive 
overtime hours, unsafe working conditions, and inadequately 
training employees on how to handle toxic chemicals 
transformed Foxconn factories into exceedingly dangerous, and 
possibly deadly, environments for their employees.5 

see also Frederik Balfour & Tim Culpan, The Man Who Makes Your iPhone, BUSINESSWEEK 
MAG., Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_38/b419
5058423479.htm (discussing how the parade was a “joint production of employee 
unions and management . . . as part of an effort to mend the collective psyche of a 
Chinese workforce”). 
2. See Joel Johnson, 1 Million Workers. 90 Million iPhones. 17 Suicides. Who’s to 
Blame?, WIRED MAG. (Feb. 28, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/
2011/02/ff_joelinchina/all (discussing the suicides that occurred at the Foxconn 
factory in Shenzhen and other parts of China); see also Randall, supra note 1, slide 9 
(discussing how at least ten workers committed suicide in 2010). 
3. See Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into an 
iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/
ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all 
(discussing that at least eighteen Foxconn workers have attempted suicide or “fell from 
buildings in manners that suggested suicide attempts”); see also Johnson, supra note 2 
(noting that some sources indicate that seventeen Foxconn workers have killed 
themselves since 2006, although Foxconn has disputed a few of the cases). 
4. See, e.g., Liu Zhiyi, The Fate of a Generation of Workers: Foxconn Undercover, 
ENGADGET (Richard Lai trans., May 19, 2010, 7:03 PM), http://www.engadget.com/
2010/05/19/the-fate-of-a-generation-of-workers-foxconn-undercover-fully-tr/ 
(describing the experience of an undercover reporter at a Foxconn factory); Johnson, 
supra note 2 (describing the author’s tour of a Foxconn plant in Shenzhen after the 
suicides); Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 (describing workers’ experiences in a 
Foxconn factory as part of a series on challenges posed by “globalized high-tech 
industries”); FAIR LAB. ASS’N, FINAL FOXCONN VERIFICATION STATUS REPORT (Dec. 
2013), http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/final_foxconn
_verification_report_0.pdf (detailing the Fair Labor Association’s extensive 
investigation of Apple’s supply-chain factories in China). 
5 . See STUDENTS & SCHOLARS AGAINST CORP. MISBEHAVIOUR, FOXCONN AND 
APPLE FAIL TO FULFILL PROMISES: PREDICAMENTS OF WORKERS AFTER THE SUICIDES 3 
(May 6, 2011), http://sacom.hk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2011-05-06_foxconn-
and-apple-fail-to-fulfill-promises.pdf (examining and summarizing their findings of 
working conditions at Foxconn factories); see also Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 
(discussing how Foxconn employees work excessive overtime, often in “onerous work 
environments and serious—sometimes deadly—safety problems”). 
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Foxconn is one of Apple’s most important manufacturers 
because of the company’s ability to produce massive quantities 
of consumer electronic products like iPhones and iPads.6 Due to 
Apple’s close affiliation with Foxconn, the US tech giant was 
subjected to harsh criticism for failing to realize that one of their 
leading supply-chain factories engaged in labor rights violations 
egregious enough to cause workers to commit suicide. 7  In 
response to the suicides and growing media attention, Foxconn 
added around three million meters of netting to the sides of 
their buildings to discourage future suicide attempts and set up 
employee counseling centers.8 
Although it is unclear to what extent Apple was aware of 
these labor violations occurring within their supply chains, the 
Foxconn-Apple scandal brought to the forefront interesting 
questions about accountability. Is Apple liable for the labor 
practices used by factories located in China? Further, should 
Apple be held liable? In more generalized terms, should a 
corporation be held responsible for possible human rights 
violations occurring in one of their supply-chains located in 
another jurisdiction? 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Company addressed the question of whether a 
company should be liable for human rights violations when such 
violations (1) occur extraterritorially and (2) another party 

6. See Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 (stating that Foxconn is one of Apple’s 
“most important manufacturing partners” because of its ability to manufacture 
“sufficient numbers of iPhones and iPads”); see also Johnson, supra note 2 (discussing 
how Foxconn, a partner of Apple, manufactures most of the world’s consumer-
electronics products). 
7. See Scott Sterling, How Apple’s Foxconn Problem Is Like Nike’s Sweatshop Problem, 
and Why the Outcome Is the Same, DIGITAL TRENDS (Oct. 10, 2012), http://
www.digitaltrends.com/apple/how-apples-foxconn-problem-is-like-nikes-sweatshop-
problem-and-why-the-outcome-is-the-same (comparing Apple’s Foxconn situation to 
the 1990s Nike sweatshop scandal); see also Susan Adams, Apple’s New Foxconn 
Embarrassment, FORBES (Sep. 12, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
susanadams/2012/09/12/apples-new-foxconn-embarrassment (reporting how Apple is 
facing criticism amidst the launch of its new iPhone 5 because “of the labor practices 
that go into making Apple’s popular products”). 
8. See Randall, supra note 1, slide 9 (depicting Foxconn’s anti-suicide nets and 
discussing how Foxconn hired mental health professionals after the 2010 suicides); see 
also Johnson, supra note 2 (discussing Foxconn’s anti-suicide nets and its online 
counseling facilities). 
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commits these violations.9 In Kiobel, the plaintiffs were residents 
of Ogoniland, a region located in Nigeria, and the defendants 
named in the case were the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
and the Shell Transport and Trading Company.10 Throughout 
the early 1990s, the Nigerian Army purportedly beat, raped, 
murdered, and arrested Ogoniland residents as well as destroyed 
and looted their property. 11  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants violated the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) by aiding 
and abetting the Nigerian Army by providing them with food, 
transportation, and compensation.12 
The Supreme Court ultimately found for the defendants 
and held that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially, in part 
because, “there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make 
the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the 
enforcement of international norms”.13 Prior to Kiobel, lower 
courts used the ATS as a way to hold corporations liable for 
violating customary international human rights law.14 The Kiobel 
decision now makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to hold 
corporations liable for human rights violations occurring 
outside the United States unless the claims “touch and concern” 
the United States with “sufficient force.”15 

9. See 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
10. Id. at 1662. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 1662–63; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (providing that courts “shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”). 
13. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668–69. 
14. See Joel Slawotsky, ATS Liability for Rogue Banking in a Post-Kiobel World, 37 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 130 (2014) (reviewing how previous Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”) cases alleged that corporations engaged or were complicit in acts of 
extrajudicial execution, torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity); see also Alien 
Tort Statute—Extraterritoriality—Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 127 HARV. L. REV. 
308, 308 (2013) [hereinafter ATS-Extraterritoriality] (describing how the ATS has been 
used by “foreign victims of human rights abuses seeking to vindicate their rights under 
international law in U.S. courts”). 
15. See ATS-Extraterritoriality, supra note 14, at 311 (summarizing how, after Kiobel, 
the ATS may only be invoked if “the claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States . . . with sufficient force”); see also Slawotsky, supra note 14, at 132–33 
(discussing how the ATS may only be invoked if a claim “touches and concerns” the 
United States with “sufficient force”). 
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Kiobel is an example of the possible issues that could arise in 
tandem with the globalization of businesses.16 When a company 
is engaged in activities abroad that could give rise to human 
rights violations, their activities touch on questions of liability, 
jurisdiction, and regulatory authority. These questions will 
continue to persist as multinational corporations (“MNCs”) 
become more interested in doing business abroad. 17  Thus, 
although fifty years ago it may have been odd to discuss the 
effects MNCs’ foreign direct investment (“FDI”) have on human 
rights, globalization has made this an increasingly pressing 
issue.18 
Additionally, the advent of bilateral investment treaties 
(“BITs”) has provided immense protections for MNCs’ 
investments into other countries. 19  A BIT is an agreement 
between two signatory states generally geared towards protecting 
the rights of investors in order to encourage the flow of FDI 

16 . See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving 
International Agenda, 101 A.J.I.L. 819, 824 (2007) (describing the difficulty of regulating 
multinational corporations because of the different sets of laws that could apply to 
these entities). See generally Symposium, The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate 
Citizen, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2001) (providing an overview of the 
challenges posed by corporations operating in multiple jurisdictions). 
17. See Kevin Kolben, Wal-Mart Is Coming, but It’s Not All Bad: Wal-Mart and Labor 
Rights in its International Subsidiaries, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 275, 278 (2007) 
(“As countries have liberalized their [foreign direct investment] regulations, foreign 
[multinational corporations] have been rapidly increasing their investment and 
operations, particularly in emerging markets, such as China and India.”); see also Steve 
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 
443, 459 (2001) (discussing how foreign investment by corporations has “significantly 
outpaced growth in international trade” because of the protections provided by 
international investment treaties and agreements). 
18 . See David Shea Bettwy, The Human Rights and Wrongs of Foreign Direct 
Investment: Addressing the Need For an Analytical Framework, 11 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 
239, 241–43 (2012) (summarizing the effects that foreign direct investment by 
multinational corporations have on human rights); see also Symposium, The 
Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing briefly 
the role multinational companies play in relation to an international civil society). 
19. See Come and Get Me, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.economist.com/
node/21547836 (reporting that Argentina, after facing an economic collapse in 2001, 
paid US$400 million in arbitration awards to MNC investors that sued Argentina under 
a BIT); see also Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to 
Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 484 (2011) (describing how MNC-
investors’ bargaining power is strengthened by BITs because these instruments provide 
them with minimum standards of protection). 
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between the two nations.20 Under a BIT, if a government acts 
and this action affects the value of an investor’s FDI, the investor 
has the right to initiate arbitration proceedings against the state 
and hold it financially liable for their economic losses.21 For 
example, in the early 2000s, multiple investors filed over forty 
arbitration claims worth hundreds of millions of dollars against 
the state of Argentina after the country defaulted due to a 
massive financial collapse.22 Although the investors do have a 
right to recover for this depreciation in their investment, 
Argentina has protested that paying all of the investors would 
force the country into a second default.23 BITs have also been 
invoked to protect the value of an MNC’s investment even if 
doing so could cause massive layoffs and reduce job security for 
state employees.24 In both of these examples, although BITs are 

20. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 484 (outlining a BIT’s structure and purpose of 
encouraging Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) between the two signatory-states); see 
also Mary E. Footer, BITs and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation 
of Foreign Investment, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 33, 36–39 (2009) (describing how 
investment treaties have developed towards promoting and protecting foreign 
investment). 
21. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability 
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 407, 408 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) 
(reporting how a number of investors filed million dollar arbitration claims against 
Argentina in 2001 even though the state was in the throes of an economic collapse); see 
also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 496 (providing a brief overview of how the threat of 
arbitration proceedings from an MNC can stifle a state’s regulatory power). 
22 . See Footer, supra note 20, at 40–41 (discussing how, after Argentina’s 
economic crisis in the early 2000s, Argentina faced liabilities estimated up to US$80 
billion); see also Ken Parks, Argentina Reaches $677M Investment Dispute Settlement—
Government, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2013, 9:54 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-
CO-20131018-705467.html (reporting that Argentina agreed to a US$677 million 
settlement with investors who brought arbitration proceedings against the state as a 
result of Argentina’s default). 
23. See Parks, supra note 22 (reporting that Argentina’s president is negotiating 
with investors to settle their claims or risk defaulting the state a second time); see also 
Argentina Tries to Delay $1.3bn Repayment to Creditors, BBC (Feb. 19, 2014, 2:28 PM), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26225135 (stating that if Argentina’s petition to 
stall its creditor repayments fails, another default could occur). 
24. Petition to Arbitral Tribunal by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers & of 
the Council of Canadians, In the Matter of a Claim under Chapter 11, Section B of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, 
Petition to the Tribunal 7–8 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ups-04.pdf (arguing 
that, in an arbitration proceeding between Canada and an MNC, a decision in favor of 
the MNC would force Canada to restructure their national postal service, which could 
seriously impact workers by causing major layoffs and affecting job security). 
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purely commercial instruments, they have been invoked in a way 
that challenges a state’s authority to regulate in areas that affect 
the wider public.25 
In July 2013, the United States and China announced that 
they were in “substantive negotiations” to finalize a US-China 
BIT.26 If a US-China BIT is finalized, it is likely that FDI will 
increase between the two nations.27 Whether or not a US-China 
BIT would negatively affect China’s regulatory authority remains 
unclear. China, however, already has such a notorious 
reputation for insufficiently protecting workers that it is widely 
known as the “world’s sweatshop.” 28  The recent Foxconn 
scandal helped to again highlight this history of permitting 
abusive labor practices, particularly in factories that produce 
products for MNCs.29 This history of poor worker protection, 

25. See Footer, supra note 20, at 41 (summarizing investor-state arbitration cases 
that affected non-commercial areas, such as access to water, environmental, and public 
health concerns); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 492 (discussing how developing 
states enter into BITs without fully understanding how the treaty could constrain the 
state’s regulatory power). 
26. See Chen Weihua, Key Investment Talks to Restart, CHINADAILY USA (July 13, 
2013, 12:57 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-07/13/content_1677
0015.htm (discussing how the United States and China agreed to restart negotiations 
for a BIT); see also Betsy Bourassa, U.S. and China Breakthrough Announcement on the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/U.S.-and-China-Breakthrough-
Announcement-.aspx (reporting that the United States and China have restarted BIT 
negotiations). 
27. See US-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, EVALUATING A POTENTIAL US-
CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: BACKGROUND, CONTEXT, AND IMPLICATIONS 11 
(Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1738&context=key_workplace (explaining how the creation of a BIT 
generally leads to an increase in FDI between the two signatory nations); see also 
Sheffer, supra note 19, at 485 (describing how foreign investment and BITs have grown 
in tandem). 
28. See Joseph Kay, China: Trouble in the World’s Sweatshop, LIBCOM (Aug. 23, 2010, 
2:45 PM), http://libcom.org/news/china-trouble-worlds-sweatshop-23082010 (“For 
nearly three decades, corporations have increasingly relocated manufacturing to China 
to take advantage of a vast supply of cheap labour and lax regulation.”); see also CHINA 
LABOR WATCH, TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE TRUTH BEHIND ELECTRONICS 
SWEATSHOPS 107 (2012) [hereinafter TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION], available at 
http://chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/20110712.pdf (comparing factories in China to 
“sweatshops previously found in 19th century industrial England”). 
29 . See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 1 (explaining how 
explosions in Chinese factories have been common for the past decade); see also David 
Barboza, In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html?
pagewanted=all (stating that despite nearly a decade’s worth of efforts “to eliminate 
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combined with MNCs’ use of BITs to fiercely protect their 
economic interests, could indicate that a US-China BIT may 
prove catastrophic for any labor rights movement in China.30 If a 
US-China BIT is signed and finalized, this Comment argues that 
it should contain strong provisions that place affirmative duties 
on signatory-nations and MNC investors to staunchly protect 
workers’ rights, as well as provide the state and investors with an 
avenue through which to enforce these obligations. 
Part I describes China’s labor and employment laws, 
relevant international labor standards promulgated by the 
International Labour Organization (“ILO”), and the 
international investment regime. Part II first discusses how 
factories in China, particularly those in contract with MNCs, 
regularly violate labor and employment laws, and then discusses 
how BITs have primarily been used to protect the interests of 
MNC investors. Lastly, Part III argues that BITs should 
incorporate stronger provisions safeguarding and upholding 
workers’ rights that could be used to hold MNCs liable for 
causing labor rights violations, directly or indirectly. 
I. BACKGROUND ON CHINA’S LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
LAWS, ILO “SOFT LAW” STANDARDS, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 
This Part lays out the background of relevant labor and 
employment laws in force in China, as well as the basic structure 
of investment treaties. Part I.A provides background information 
on the 1994 Labor Law. Part I.B then discusses China’s changes 
to their employment laws in 2008. Parts I.C and I.D detail the 
Trade Union Law and China’s regulations of collective 
contracts, respectively. Part I.E next describes relevant labor 
standards promulgated by the ILO. Lastly, Part I.F provides a 

sweatshop labor conditions in Asia, worker abuse is still commonplace in many of the 
Chinese factories that supply Western companies”). 
30 . See CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN: DEPLORABLE WORKING 
CONDITIONS CHARACTERIZE APPLE’S ENTIRE SUPPLY CHAIN 3 (2012) [hereinafter CHINA 
LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN], available at http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/
2012627-5.pdf (concluding that “serious work-related injuries and worker suicides” are 
pervasive throughout Apple’s factories in China); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 484 
(discussing how BITs empower MNCs because MNCs could use the “threat of a multi-
million dollar adverse arbitration decision” to pressure states into placating MNCs and 
their economic interests). 
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brief history of the development of international investment 
agreements. 
A. China’s 1994 Labor Law 
In 1994, China passed its first law regulating employer and 
employee relationships. 31  The 1994 Labor Law requires an 
individual employment contract to be signed whenever an 
employer and employee relationship is created. 32  These 
employment contracts are required to contain generalized 
provisions pertaining to a job’s duration, its responsibilities, 
wages, and workplace safety guarantees.33 Employment contracts 
must also have provisions detailing disciplinary proceedings, 
conditions for termination, and consequences for violating the 
contract.34 
The 1994 Labor Law also outlines the substantive 
requirements of employment contracts.35 For instance, the law 
generally provides that the “State shall implement a system of 
guaranteed minimum wages” and that a worker’s wages “shall 
not be lower than the local standards of minimum wages.”36 The 
law also states that workers are not permitted to work more than 

31 . See Virginia Harper Ho, From Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at 
Implementation Under China’s New Labor Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 45–46 
(2009) (“The foundation of modern Chinese labor and employment law is the national 
Labor Law, which took effect on January 1, 1995.”); see also Baogang Guo, China’s Labor 
Standards: Myths and Realities, CHINA RESEARCH CENTER 2 (Feb. 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.academia.edu/165449/Chinas_Labor_Standards_Myths_and_Realities 
(“The Labor Act of 1994 is the first comprehensive labor standards law in China.”). 
32. 1994 Laodong Fa (຿ືἲ) [1994 Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) P.R.C. LAWS & REGS 
art. 16, translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_
1383754.htm (“A labour contract shall be concluded where a labour relationship is to 
be established.”). 
33. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, art. 19 (listing clauses that must be included in 
an employment contract, including clauses on the job’s duration, the job’s 
responsibilities, and working conditions). 
34. Id. (requiring employment contracts to include clauses relating to disciplinary 
proceedings, conditions for terminating the contract, and the sanctions for violating 
the contract). 
35 . Id. arts. 36–65 (outlining the substantive requirements for employment 
contract provisions, such as provisions on wages, working hours, and workplace safety 
standards). 
36. Id. art. 48 (stating that employees shall not be paid a wage lower than the 
state’s minimum wage). 
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eight hours per day or more than forty-four hours per week.37 In 
cases where an employer needs to extend working hours, the 
employer may do so after consulting with the labor union and 
the workers.38 Overtime must not exceed thirty-six hours per 
month but exceptions are allowed for unexpected circumstances 
like a natural disaster.39 The 1994 Labor Law also states that the 
employment contract should specify the job’s duration as either 
a fixed term, non-fixed term, or based on the completion of a 
specific project.40 
The 1994 Labor Law provides workers with additional 
rights. Under the 1994 Law, for example, workers have a right to 
rest, to take vacations, and a right to work in an environment 
that is safe and does not endanger their health.41 Workers also 
have the right to participate in and organize labor unions that 
must “represent and safeguard the legitimate rights and 
interests of all labourers.”42 Through unionization, workers have 
the right to negotiate with employers on “equal footing.”43 
Further, workers have the right to request assistance and 
support from a labor union in arbitration or court proceedings 
over wrongful termination claims.44 Workers also have the right 
to engage in collective negotiations with the employer to create 
a collective contract. 45  These collective contracts set out 
minimum standards pertaining to wages, working hours, rest 
hours, vacations, and workplace safety requirements that each 

37. Id. art. 36 (“The State shall practise a working hour system wherein labourers 
shall work for no more than eight hours a day and no more than 44 hours a week on 
the average.”). 
38. Id. art. 41 (allowing employers to extend working hours after consulting with 
the labor union and the workers). 
39. Id. arts. 41–42 (permitting employees to work only one overtime hour per day 
and a maximum of thirty-six overtime hours per month, with exceptions for certain 
extenuating circumstances, such as a natural disaster or a slow-down in production that 
would affect the public interest). 
40. Id. art. 20 (“The term of a labour contract is classified into fixed term, non-
fixed term and the completion of a specific assignment as a term.”). 
41. Id. art. 3 (stating that workers shall have the right to rest, to take vacations, 
and to a safe and healthy workplace environment). 
42. Id. arts. 7–8 (giving workers the right to participate in and organize labor 
unions and requiring unions to represent workers’ rights and interests). 
43. Id. (requiring employers to negotiate on “equal footing” with employees). 
44. Id. art. 30 (giving workers the right to receive assistance and support from 
labor unions in arbitrations or lawsuits over wrongful termination claims). 
45. Id. art. 33 (stating that workers have the right to negotiate for a collective 
contract with employers). 
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individual employment contract must meet.46 In other words, an 
individual employment contract cannot contain clauses that are 
less protective than the ones contained in a collective contract.47 
Lastly, the new law provides that workers have the right to 
initiate proceedings in a mediation committee, an arbitration 
committee, or a court, should any dispute arise between the 
worker and employer.48 
To ensure compliance, the 1994 Labor Law imposes 
obligations on both employers and the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security (“MLSS”), China’s administrative department of 
labor. The MLSS is charged with regulating and managing 
workers and their relationships with employers.49 Employers are 
expected to establish new workplace rules that comply with the 
1994 Labor Law.50 The MLSS must also take steps to help 
enforce compliance with the law in order to adequately protect 
workers against employers.51 Specifically, the MLSS must ensure 
that employers are complying with the new law and it is required 
to address and rectify situations in which a violation does 
occur.52 For example, the MLSS can issue a warning and order 
the employer to provide compensation to any worker harmed by 
an employment law violation.53  Further, employers who use 

46. Id. (listing out the terms that may be included in a collective contract, such as 
provisions on wages, work hours, workplace safety requirements, rest, and vacation). 
47. Id. art. 35 (“The standards of working conditions and labour remuneration 
agreed upon in labour contracts concluded between individual labourers and the 
enterprise shall not be lower than those stipulated in the collective contract.”). 
48. Id. art. 79 (giving workers the right to resolve disputes with their employers in 
a mediation or arbitration tribunal and, as a last resort, to bring the dispute to a court 
if any party is unsatisfied with the mediation or arbitration decision). 
49 . Ministry of Labor and Social Security, GOV.CN, http://english.gov.cn/2005-
10/02/content_74185.htm (“The [MLSS] . . . is in charge of labor force management, 
labor relationship readjustment, various items of social insurance management and 
legal construction of labor and social security.”). 
50. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, art. 4 (“The employing units shall establish 
and perfect rules and regulations in accordance with the law . . . .”). 
51 . Id. art. 5 (requiring the state to take “various measures to promote 
employment . . . lay down labour standards . . . and gradually raise the living standard 
of labourers”). 
52. Id. art. 85 (requiring the MLSS to “supervise and inspect the implementation 
of laws, rules and regulations on labour by the employing unit, and have the power to 
stop any acts that run counter to laws, rules and regulations on labour and order the 
rectification thereof”). 
53. Id. art. 89 (“Where the rules and regulations on labour formulated by the 
employing unit run counter to the provisions of laws, rules and regulations, the 
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violence or intimidation against employees can be criminally 
sanctioned and subjected to a warning, a fine, or a fifteen-day 
detention.54 Employers who force their employees to work in an 
unsafe workplace environment may also be similarly 
sanctioned.55 
B. Changes to China’s Employment Law in 2008 
After the passage of the 1994 Labor Law, widespread 
changes in labor conditions were not immediately realized.56 
With employers attempting to bypass the law through the 
extensive use of dispatched workers (workers hired through an 
intermediary employment agency), arrangements for which 
individual employment contracts were not explicitly required, 
many employer-employee relationships failed to culminate in a 
contract. 57  In other cases, employers disregarded the law 
altogether.58 

administrative department of labour shall give a warning to the unit, and order it to 
make corrections; where any harms have been caused to labourers, the unit shall be 
liable for compensation.”). 
54. Id. art. 96 (providing that if an employer uses intimidation or violence against 
employees, the employer could be punished with a fifteen day detention, a fine, or a 
warning). 
55. Id. art. 93 (stating that employers who compel their workers to work in an 
unsafe workplace environment “shall be investigated for criminal responsibility”). 
56. See Sara Biddulph, Responding to the Industrial Unrest in China: Prospects for 
Strengthening the Role of Collective Bargaining, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 35, 41 (2012) 
(explaining how, despite the passage of the 1994 Labor Law, many workers still did not 
have an employment contract); see also Dr. Louise Willans Floyd, When Old Meets New: 
Some Perspectives on Recent Chinese Legal Developments and Their Relevance to the United 
States (The Importance of Labor Law), 64 SMU L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2011) (discussing 
briefly how the 2008 reforms were enacted in order to address the myriad problems still 
faced by workers in China despite the 1994 Labor Law). 
57. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 66 (“In keeping with global trends toward 
more flexible and less stable employment relationships, employers in China also now 
rely extensively on informal, part-time, temporary, or subcontracted workers, 
arrangements which are not fully addressed under the 1994 Labor Law.”); see also 
Beijing Tightens Loophole on Hiring Temporary Workers, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2012, 6:59 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-china-labor-idUSBRE8BR041201
21228 (discussing how employers in China are more frequently using workers hired via 
intermediary agencies in order to avoid complying with the new employment laws). 
58. See Biddulph, supra note 56, at 40 (explaining how the 1994 Labor Law “failed 
to provide adequate protection from abusive practices especially to the ever growing 
number of workers leaving rural areas to find work in construction, small and medium-
sized private enterprises, labour-intensive and export-oriented industries”); see also Li 
Jing, China’s New Labor Contract Law and Protection of Workers, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
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China enacted new employment legislation in 2008 that 
helped to address some of the shortcomings from the 1994 
Labor Law.59 First, China passed the Labor Dispute Mediation 
and Arbitration Law (“LMAL”) that provides workers and 
employers with clearer guidelines about how to resolve labor 
disputes.60 Second, the Employment Promotion Law (“EPL”) 
recognizes a worker’s right to work and to receive assistance 
from the government when looking for a job.61 Third, the Labor 
Contract Law (“LCL”) forms the core of the new legislation by 
improving on the 1994 Labor Law.62 
1. Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law 
The LMAL was enacted to help resolve disputes between 
employers and employees in a way that would protect the 
interests and rights of both parties.63 The law is applicable to 
disputes over wages, work hours, rest and vacation terms, the 
safety of the workplace environment, expenses for job-related 
injuries, and other work-related damages. 64  The LMAL 

1083, 1110–12 (2009) (discussing how employers did not sign individual employment 
contracts with workers so as to avoid the 1994 Labor Law’s substantive requirements). 
59. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 38 (“In 2008, however, three new primary 
labor laws took effect that together represent the first major retooling of China’s labor 
legislation since its national Labor Law was enacted in 1994 . . . .”); see also Jing, supra 
note 58, at 1106 (“The Labor Contract Law purports to draw upon China’s twenty-year-
plus experience with labor contract practices and sets out to respond to some of the 
manifest deficiencies of the Labor Law.”). 
60. Dui Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (ᑞ຿ື∑㆟ㄪゎ௰⿢ἲ) [Labor 
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) P.R.C. LAWS & REGS art. 1, 
translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471
614.htm (stating that this law was “enacted in order to resolve labor disputes in an 
impartial and timely manner”). 
61. Jiuye Cujin Fa (ᑵᴗಁ㐍ἲ) [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) P.R.C. 
LAWS & REGS arts. 3, 52, translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-
02/20/content_1471590.htm (recognizing a worker’s right to work and requiring the 
state to assist workers in finding jobs). 
62. Laodong Hetong Fa (຿ືྜྠἲ) [Labour Contract Law] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) P.R.C. 
LAWS & REGS art. 1, translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/
content_1471106.htm (announcing that the law was enacted to improve on the 
employment contract system). 
63. Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, supra note 60, art. 1 (stating 
that the LMAL was enacted to “protect the lawful rights and interests of the parties”). 
64. Id. art. 2 (describing the disputes which the LMAL regulates). 
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emphasizes that workers have rights when they are in a dispute 
consultation with an employer, such as the right to ask a labor 
union or third party to participate in the consultation.65 Further, 
if a dispute involves ten or more workers requesting the same 
form of relief, the workers can choose one worker to act as the 
worker representative during any mediation, arbitration, or 
litigation proceedings.66 The LMAL also gives workers the right 
to file a complaint with the MLSS if an employer fails to pay 
wages or other monetary damages for job-related injuries.67 
The LMAL sets out specific guidelines on how employees 
and employers should resolve an employment dispute. First, 
workers may resolve the dispute by consulting with their 
employer.68 If the consultation does not lead to a satisfactory 
resolution, the parties may file an application with a mediation 
committee. 69  In mediation, the worker is represented by a 
worker representative who is either someone from the labor 
union or a person designated by the workers to serve as the 
worker representative. 70  The mediator must be either a 
representative from the labor union or a person chosen by both 
parties.71 
If mediation fails to resolve the dispute within fifteen days 
of when the mediation application was first filed, or if one of the 
parties fails to comply with a mediation settlement’s terms, 

65. Id. art. 4 (explaining that, should a dispute arise, workers may ask a union or 
third-party to join in on a consultation with the employer). 
66. Id. art. 7 (giving workers the right to choose a worker representative in 
disputes involving ten or more workers). 
67. Id. art. 9 (providing that, when an employer “defaults in the payment of labor 
remuneration or . . . defaults in the payment of medical expenses for job-related injury, 
economic compensation or damages, the worker concerned may make a complaint to 
the administrative department of labor”). 
68. Id. art. 4 (”When a labor dispute arises, the worker concerned may have a 
consultation with the employing unit . . . .”). 
69. Id. art. 5 (“Where a labor dispute arises and the parties are not willing to have 
a consultation, or the consultation fails, or the settlement agreement reached is not 
performed, they may apply to a mediation institution for mediation.”). 
70. Id. art. 10 (requiring the worker representative in a mediation proceeding to 
be a member of the union or someone designated by all the employees). 
71 . Id. (“The director of the labor-dispute mediation commission of the 
enterprise shall be a trade union member or a person chosen by both parties.”). 
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either party may apply for arbitration.72 Arbitration differs from 
mediation in that, in an arbitration proceeding, representatives 
for the MLSS, the labor union, and the employers comprise the 
arbitration commission. 73  The number of arbitrators on an 
arbitration commission must be an odd number.74 The LMAL 
does not explain how arbitrators are chosen, but does require 
arbitrators to have some legal experience or experience with 
working in a labor union or human resources management 
position.75 Although the LMAL is silent as to which party should 
pay for mediation or litigation, the government is required to 
pay any fees incurred by either party during an arbitration 
proceeding. 76  If a party is dissatisfied with an arbitration 
decision, litigation may be used as a last resort.77 Workers can 
initiate litigation challenging an arbitral award within fifteen 
days from when the arbitral award was issued while employers 
can only challenge an arbitral award under certain specified 
circumstances.78 
2. The Employment Promotion Law 
The EPL emphasizes that workers have the right to work 
and to choose a job.79 The EPL further provides workers with 
rights and assistance when it comes to obtaining a job by 
requiring the government to provide information and resources 
to workers looking for employment.80 Local governments must 
also provide workers with free consultations detailing 

72. Id. art. 14 (providing that if the parties do not reach a mediation agreement 
within fifteen days or the mediation agreement does not provide satisfactory results, 
either party may apply for arbitration). 
73. Id. art. 19 (stating that an arbitration proceeding shall be composed of 
representatives for the MLSS, the labor union, and the employer). 
74 . Id. (requiring an odd number of arbitrators to serve on an arbitration 
commission). 
75. Id. art. 20 (listing out the requirements for arbitrators). 
76. Id. art. 53 (“Arbitration of labor disputes is free of charge.”). 
77. Id. art. 5 (providing that if either party is dissatisfied with an arbitral award, it 
“may initiate a litigation”). 
78. Id. arts. 48–49 (stating that a worker who is dissatisfied with an arbitral award 
may challenge it in court, while employers may only challenge arbitral awards under 
listed circumstances). 
79. Employment Promotion Law, supra note 61, art. 3 (upholding a worker’s right 
to work and the right to choose a job). 
80. Id. art. 7 (requiring the state to assist workers in finding a job). 
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employment policies and regulations.81 Labor unions, and other 
public organizations, must also provide workers looking for jobs 
with support and assistance.82 
More importantly, the EPL has extensive provisions 
requiring intermediaries to respect workers’ rights and 
interests. 83  Intermediaries, or labor dispatch companies, 
contract with individual employees and dispatch these 
employees as needed to different worksites.84 Since workers sign 
contracts directly with the intermediary, employers are not 
required to sign individual employment contracts with these 
dispatched workers and thus owe them no contractual 
obligations.85 
The EPL further regulates intermediaries by requiring 
them to register with the administrative department for industry 
and commerce.86 Intermediaries are also prohibited from lying 
to employees or employers, working with employers operating 
illegally, and withholding a worker’s identification materials or 
other documents. 87  If an intermediary violates any of the 
provisions laid out in the EPL, the intermediary may be 

81. Id. art. 35 (obligating governments at the county level to provide information 
about employment laws and regulations to workers). 
82. Id. art. 9 (requiring labor unions and other public organizations, like women’s 
groups or disabled person’s groups, to help protect and support workers’ right to 
work). 
83. Id. art. 39 (stating that intermediaries “are prohibited from infringing on the 
legitimate rights and interests of the workers” who use their services). 
84. See Labor Dispatch System in Reform: Window on the South (༡桶䨿), CHINA LAB. 
NEWS TRANSLATION 1 (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.clntranslations.org/file_
download/139 (describing how intermediaries contract directly with the employee and 
subsequently dispatch these employees to employers); see also Dexter Roberts, Why 
China’s Factories Are Turning to Temp Workers, BUS. WK., Mar. 8, 2012, 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-08/why-chinas-factories-are-turning-to-
temp-workers (“‘Labor dispatch’ companies recruit workers and send them as 
temporary staff to factories in need.”). 
85. See Labor Dispatch System in Reform, supra note 84, at 2 (explaining how 
employers have avoided compliance with employment laws through the use of 
dispatched or temporary contract employees); see also Roberts, supra note 84 (reporting 
that employers are more frequently using dispatched workers in order to avoid 
complying with employment laws). 
86. Employment Promotion Law, supra note 61, art. 40 (requiring intermediaries 
to seek permission from and register with the administrative department of industry 
and commerce). 
87. Id. art. 41 (prohibiting intermediaries from providing false information, 
working with employers operating illegally, or withholding a worker’s documents). 
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subjected to a fine.88 If an intermediary charges a worker for 
using its services, the MLSS must order the intermediary to 
reimburse the worker and fine the intermediary at least 
CNY¥500 (approximately US$81).89 
3. The Labor Contract Law 
The LCL, echoing the 1994 Labor Law, requires employers 
and employees to sign individual employment contracts.90 This 
law applies to fixed-term employment contracts, open-ended 
employment contracts, and employment contracts that expire 
upon the completion of a specified task.91 Unlike the 1994 
Labor Law, the LCL defines fixed-term and open-ended 
contracts and gives workers the right to negotiate with their 
employers over the length of these terms.92 An employment 
contract is required to contain terms pertaining to work hours, 
rest breaks, vacation hours, wages, and occupational health and 
safety standards.93 If an employer and employee fail to conclude 
a written employment contract within one year of when the 
worker was first hired, an open-ended contract is automatically 
created.94 
The LCL establishes default terms for employment 
contracts should an employer fail to create one with an 
individual employee. For instance, if an employee has started 
working without an individual employment contract, the 
employee’s wage is based on the rate specified in the collective 

88. Id. arts. 65–66 (stating that intermediaries may be fined for providing false 
information, withholding a worker’s documents, or operating without permission). 
89. Id. art. 66 (requiring the MLSS to fine an intermediary CNY¥500 but not more 
than CNY¥2,000 if the intermediary forces a worker to pay a deposit for using its 
services). 
90 . Labour Contract Law, supra note 62, art. 10 (“To establish a labor 
relationship, a written labor contract shall be concluded.”). 
91. Id. art. 12 (“Labor contracts consist of fixed-term labor contracts, open-ended 
labor contracts and labor contracts that expire upon completion of given jobs.”). 
92. Id. arts. 13–14 (defining fixed-term contracts as contracts with specified end 
dates agreed upon by the employees and employers, and defining open-ended 
employment contracts as contracts where the employees and employers agree to not fix 
an end date). 
93. Id. art. 17 (listing the terms required in employment contracts). 
94. Id. art. 14 (providing that an employment contract is automatically created if 
an employer “fails to conclude a written [employment] contract with a worker within 
one year”). 
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contract or, if the collective contract does not address wages, 
local minimum wage standards.95 Further, if a dispute arises over 
hours or workplace safety issues and the employer and employee 
cannot reach an agreement, the provisions in the collective 
contract shall apply and, if there is no collective contract, local 
laws on hours and working conditions apply.96 
The LCL also provides workers with the right to revoke the 
employment contract in whole or in part if the contract was 
created through misrepresentation or coercion or contains 
provisions waiving an employer’s obligations under relevant 
employment laws and regulations.97  Even if an employment 
contract or a provision of the contract is revoked, an employer 
must still pay the worker for any work performed by using the 
average wage paid to similarly situated employees.98 A worker is 
also given the right to revoke their contract if an employer fails 
to provide safe working conditions, pay wages on time and in 
full, or otherwise impairs a worker’s interest or rights in any 
way.99 If an employer uses violence or intimidation to compel a 
worker to work, the worker has the right to revoke the 
employment contract without notifying the employer in 
advance. 100  Lastly, the LCL gives workers the right to 
immediately petition the court for relief if the employer fails to 
pay wages on time rather than going through an extensive 
mediation and arbitration process first.101 

95. Id. art. 11 (stating that the collective contract or local minimum wage 
standards shall be used as default terms if an employee is working without an individual 
employment contract). 
96. Id. art. 18 (discussing how, if an employer and employees fail to reach a 
resolution during a dispute about hours or working conditions, relevant collective 
contract provisions or local laws will apply as default terms). 
97. Id. art. 26 (invalidating an employment contract or parts of an employment 
contract obtained through misrepresentation or coercion or if it contains provisions 
waiving an employer’s obligations to comply with employment laws). 
98. Id. art. 28 (requiring the employer to pay workers for any work performed 
under an employment contract, even if the employment contract is later invalidated). 
99. Id. art. 38 (providing employees with the right to revoke an employment 
contract if the employer fails to provide safe working conditions, pay wages on time and 
in full, or abide by relevant employment laws and regulations). 
100. Id. (“If an employing unit forces a person to work by resorting to violence, 
intimidation or illegal restriction of personal freedom . . . , [the worker] may revoke 
the labor contract forthwith without notifying the employing unit of the matter in 
advance.”). 
101. Id. art. 30 (stating that, if an employer defaults in paying wages, the worker 
may petition a court to order the employer to pay). 
1234 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1215 
The LCL further restricts employers by prohibiting them 
from immediately terminating an employee who cannot work 
due to a work-related injury or who is on medical leave.102 
Employers also cannot immediately fire a worker who has 
worked for the employer continuously for fifteen years and is 
five years away from reaching retirement age.103 In other words, 
Article 42 of the LCL protects groups of employees, like the 
injured and the elderly, from being immediately fired by an 
employer unless there is some exceeding justification for the 
termination. In any other circumstance, an employer may fire 
the employee after providing notice thirty days in advance or 
paying the employee an extra month’s salary.104 Employers must 
inform their employees about any workplace rules, regulations, 
and decisions that have a direct bearing on the workers’ 
immediate interests.105 Employers must provide employees with 
accurate information about the job’s occupational hazards and 
safety issues and remuneration guidelines, as well as any other 
information the worker requests.106 Under the LCL, employers 
cannot violate labor quotas or compel workers to work 
overtime. 107  The LCL also provides more protections for 
dispatched workers by requiring intermediaries to sign at least a 
two-year, fixed-term contract with each dispatched worker, to 
pay wages on a monthly basis, and to specify the length of time a 
dispatched worker can work at a specific worksite. 108 

102. Id. art. 42(1)–(2) (prohibiting employers from terminating an employment 
contract with an employee who cannot work due to a work-related injury or an illness). 
103. Id. art. 42(5) (stating that employers may not immediately fire a worker who 
had worked with the employer for fifteen years and is five years away from retirement 
age). 
104. Id. arts. 40, 42 (listing the circumstances under which an employer must 
either provide notice to a worker before terminating an employment contract or pay an 
extra month’s salary). 
105. Id. art. 4 (“The employing unit shall make public or inform the workers of 
the rules and regulations, and the decisions on important matters, which have a direct 
bearing on the immediate interests of the workers.”). 
106. Id. art. 8 (“When an employing unit recruits a worker, it shall truthfully 
inform him of the job description, the working conditions, the place of work, 
occupational hazards, conditions for work safety, labor remuneration and other 
matters which the worker requests to be informed of.”). 
107. Id. art. 31 (barring employers from violating labor quotas or compelling 
employees to work overtime). 
108. Id. arts. 58–59 (requiring intermediaries to sign two-year, fixed-term contracts 
with each worker, pay workers on a monthly basis, and to specify how long each worker 
will stay at a worksite). 
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Intermediaries are prohibited from charging workers a fee for 
using their services and from pocketing any of the workers’ 
wages.109 
Employers must consult with the union or a chosen 
workers’ representative before making any decision that might 
affect the immediate interests of workers, such as decisions 
relating to remuneration, work hours, rest and vacation times, 
occupational safety and health standards, worker’s insurance 
and welfare, training, disciplinary proceedings, and labor 
quotas.110 For example, if an employer needs to cut employment 
by more than twenty persons or more than ten percent of the 
total number of employees, the employer may do so only after 
consulting with the union or all of the employees thirty days 
prior.111 An employer, however, is allowed to significantly cut 
down their workforce only if it is absolutely necessary, such as if 
the company is facing dire production and management issues 
or cannot afford to keep the same amount of workers.112 
The LCL reiterates that workers have the right to negotiate 
for a collective contract with their employers.113 A labor union 
or, if a labor union has not yet been established, a worker 
representative elected by the workers, must sign off on the 
collective contract.114 In contrast to the 1994 Labor Law, the 
LCL further provides that the MLSS must approve a collective 
contract before it becomes effectuated.115 
The LCL gives labor unions a more active role in 
representing workers’ rights by permitting unions to 
immediately initiate arbitration or litigation proceedings against 

109. Id. art. 60 (prohibiting intermediaries from charging workers a fee or from 
pocketing a worker’s wages). 
110. Id. art. 4 (requiring employers to consult with either the labor union or a 
workers’ representative before making any decision that might affect workers’ interests 
and rights). 
111. Id. art. 41 (stating that if an employer fires a certain number or percentage of 
their workforce, the employer must do so after notifying the labor union or all the 
employees at least thirty days in advance). 
112. Id. (allowing employers to lay off a significant portion of their workforce only 
if the company is facing major production, management, or financial issues). 
113. Id. art. 51 (giving workers the right to negotiate for a collective contract). 
114. Id. (stating that a collective contract must be approved by either a labor 
union or by a worker representative elected by the workers). 
115. Id. art. 54 (requiring the MLSS to approve a collective contract before it 
becomes valid). 
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an employer in disputes over collective contract provisions.116 If 
a worker individually brings an arbitration or litigation 
proceeding against an employer, labor unions must provide the 
worker with support and assistance.117 Labor unions must also 
provide assistance and guidance to workers who are in 
negotiations with an employer to create an individual 
employment contract.118 The LCL also requires labor unions to 
supervise employers to ensure that they are abiding by the terms 
of an individual employment contract or the collective 
contract.119 
The LCL sets out more specific penalties for employers and 
intermediaries who violate the law. If an employer fails to 
conclude an individual employment contract with a worker, the 
employer must pay the worker two times his salary for each 
month the worker has worked without an employment contract 
for up to a year, at which point an open-ended contract is 
automatically created.120 In cases where an employer withholds 
wages from an employee or fails to pay adequate overtime wages, 
the MLSS must order the employer to pay these wages, and if 
the employer continues to withhold wages the MLSS can order 
the employer to pay additional compensation. 121  If an 
intermediary withholds a worker’s identification cards or other 
documents, the MLSS must order the intermediary to return 
these documents.122 If an intermediary commits a particular 
serious violation of the LCL, the MLSS must fine the 

116. Id. art. 56 (giving labor unions the power to directly initiate arbitration or 
litigation proceedings against an employer in a dispute over the provisions of a 
collective contract). 
117. Id. art. 78 (“Where a worker applies for arbitration or brings a lawsuit, the 
trade union concerned shall provide him with support and assistance . . . .”). 
118. Id. art. 6 (“The trade union shall give assistance and guidance to the workers 
in lawfully concluding labor contracts with the employing unit . . . .”). 
119. Id. art. 78 (requiring labor unions to “supervise the performance of labor 
contracts and collective contracts by the employing units” in order to protect the rights 
and interests of workers). 
120. Id. art. 82 (ordering employers to pay a worker twice their salary per month 
and automatically creating an open-ended contract after a year). 
121. Id. art. 85 (requiring the MLSS to order employers to pay employees any 
back-wages and additional compensation if the employer continues to withhold wages). 
122. Id. art. 84 (requiring the MLSS to order intermediaries to return any 
documents provided to the intermediary by an employee). 
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intermediary at least CNY¥1000 (approximately US$162) but 
not more than CNY¥5000  (approximately US$80).123 
C. China’s Laws Governing Labor Unions: The Trade Union Law 
The 1992 Trade Union Law (“1992 TUL”) first codified 
China’s unions’ right to initiate collective contract negotiations 
with employers.124 The 1992 TUL was amended in 2001 (“2001 
TUL”), and these amendments strengthened workers’ rights to 
join and participate in a labor union.125 The 2001 TUL generally 
provides that a labor union must protect the interests and rights 
of workers while simultaneously protecting China’s overall state 
interests.126 Under the 2001 TUL, labor unions must listen to 
workers’ complaints, voice workers’ demands and opinions, and 
“help them solve their difficulties and serve them 
wholeheartedly.”127 Like the LCL, the 2001 TUL gives labor 
unions the right to initiate consultation, arbitration, and then 
litigation proceedings directly against the employer if the 
employer violates a worker’s rights or interests.128 The 2001 TUL 
provides further protections for workers who join a union by 
granting the MLSS the power to order the employer to reinstate 
the employee and pay any back wages in the event of a labor or 

123. Id. art. 92 (requiring the MLSS to fine an intermediary at least CNY¥1000 for 
particularly serious violations but not more than CNY¥5000). 
124 . See Ronald C. Brown, China’s Collective Contract Provisions: Can Collective 
Negotiations Embody Collective Bargaining?, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 37 (2006) 
(“The 1992 Trade Union Law in fact first authorized unions at the enterprise level to 
conclude collective contracts with the employer.”); see also 1992 Gonghui Fa (ᕤ᭳ἲ) 
[1992 Trade Union Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Apr. 3, 1992, effective Apr. 3, 1992) P.R.C. LAWS & REGS art. 6, translated at http://
english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053571.html 
(codifying labor unions’ obligation to represent the interests and rights of workers). 
125. 2001 Gonghui Fa (ᕤ᭳ἲ) [2001 Trade Union Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001) P.R.C. 
LAWS & REGS art. 3, translated at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/11/content_
75948.htm (reaffirming workers’ rights to join labor unions). 
126. 2001 Trade Union Law, supra note 125, art. 6 (stating that labor unions must 
“safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of workers . . . . [w]hile protecting the 
overall interests of the entire Chinese people”). 
127. Id. (requiring unions to listen to workers’ complaints, voice their demands, 
and overall assist workers with any difficulties). 
128. Id. art. 20 (providing that labor unions may initiate arbitration or litigation 
proceedings against an employer if an employer violates a worker’s rights or interests). 
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employment law violation.129 The 2001 TUL prohibits employers 
from insulting, slandering, injuring, or taking retaliatory action 
against a union’s staff members. 130  The 2001 TUL, overall, 
improved on the 1992 TUL by strengthening a labor union’s 
obligation to protect workers’ rights and interests.131 
D. China’s Provisions on Collective Contracts 
The MLSS promulgated the Provisions on Collective 
Contract (“Provisions”) in 2004. 132  The purpose of the 
Provisions is to strengthen the rights of workers during 
negotiations for collective contracts.133 The Provisions cover all 
commercial institutions in China, both public and private.134 
Under the Provisions, the labor union chooses a worker 
representative or, if a labor union has not yet been established, 
the employees may vote for a person to act as the workers’ 
representative during collective negotiations. 135  The worker 
representative must represent the workers’ interests.136 Before 
the collective contract becomes valid, first it must be submitted 
to and approved by the employees.137 Collective contracts are 

129. Id. art. 52 (explaining that an employer is required to rehire an employee 
and pay any back wages if the employee was fired for participating in a union). 
130. Id. art. 51 (stating that employers who humiliate, slander, or injure a staff 
member of a labor union may be subjected to a criminal investigation). 
131. See Brown, supra note 124, at 37 (“The Trade Union Law as amended in 2001 
continued to strengthen the union’s mandate in collective wage negotiations.”); see also 
CLB Analysis of the New Trade Union Law, CHINA LABOUR BULL. (Feb. 28, 2002), 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/clb-analysis-new-trade-union-law (hesitantly 
agreeing that the 2001 Trade Union Law comes closer to ILO standards but leaves 
much to be desired). 
132. Guanyu Jiti Hetong De Guiding (㜝᪊㞟㧓ྜྠⓗつᐃ) [Provisions on 
Collective Contract] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, May 1, 
2004, effective May 1, 2004), translated at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
pocc373. 
133. Provisions on Collective Contract, supra note 132, art. 1 (providing that the 
purpose of the Provisions is to further protect both workers’ and employers’ interests 
when they are engaged in negotiations to create a collective contract). 
134. Id. art. 2 (stating that the Provisions apply to both commercial enterprises 
and public institutions). 
135. Id. art. 20 (laying out the procedures in choosing a worker representative 
both in scenarios in which there is a union and when there is not). 
136. Id. art. 19 (requiring a worker’s representative to “take part in the collective 
negotiation on behalf of the interests of their own party”). 
137. Id. art. 36 (providing that a collective contract may not be adopted unless the 
contract is discussed at a meeting where at least two thirds of all the employees or 
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not permanent and the parties to the negotiation may stipulate 
to keep the collective contract for at least one year but no more 
than three years.138 Further, collective contracts may be modified 
or cancelled if either party cannot perform its contractual 
duties.139 The employer must have a justifiable reason to refuse 
participating in collective negotiations.140  
E. International Labor Standards and Rights 
China joined the ILO in 1919.141 The ILO’s purpose is to 
promote cooperation between employers, workers, and 
governments in order to further protect and reinforce the rights 
of workers.142 The ILO promulgates conventions that set out 
basic principles on workers’ rights.143 These conventions, once 
ratified by a member state, are legally binding instruments in 
that state. 144  The ILO has identified eight conventions as 
fundamental because they cover “subjects that are considered as 
fundamental principles and rights at work.”145 China has ratified 
twenty-five of the ILO’s conventions, twenty-two of which are still 
in force. 146  China has ratified half of the fundamental 
conventions, and specifically has not ratified (1) Convention No. 
87, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 

employee representatives are present and half of the employees or the employee 
representatives approve the contract). 
138. Id. art. 38 (“In general, the period of validity of a collective contract or a 
special collective contract shall be 1 to 3 years . . . .”). 
139. Id. art. 40 (listing the circumstances under which a collective contract may be 
modified or cancelled). 
140. Id. art. 56 (stating that an employer cannot refuse to engage in collective 
negotiations without a justifiable reason). 
141 . China, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:
11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103404 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
142. How the ILO Works, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-
ilo-works/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
143 . Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/
standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-
recommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (describing the 
purpose of the ILO conventions). 
144. Id. (stating that once a member state ratifies a convention, it becomes a 
legally binding international treaty). 
145. Id. (listing the conventions considered as fundamental by the ILO). 
146. Ratifications for China, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:
11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103404 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). The 
three conventions not in force are either outdated conventions or shelved conventions, 
meaning that they are no longer regularly updated by the ILO. 
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Organize Convention, (2) Convention No. 98, the Right to 
Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, (3) 
Convention No. 29, the Forced Labour Convention, and (4) 
Convention No. 105, the Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention.147 Generally, these conventions protect a worker’s 
right to form a union and engage in collective bargaining, and 
prohibit the use of forced or compulsory labor.148 Even if a 
member has not yet ratified a specific fundamental convention, 
all members of the ILO have an obligation to promote and 
realize these conventions’ espoused principles.149 
This Part first discusses the ILO Declaration on Social 
Justice, which is a restatement of the ILO’s main principles 
within the context of a more globalized economy. It next 
discusses the declaration the ILO adopted addressing the 
interactions of MNCs, state governments, and the rights of 
workers. 
1. The ILO Declaration on Social Justice 
In 2008, the Ninety-Seventh International Labour 
Conference adopted the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a 
Fair Globalization (the “ILO Declaration on Social Justice”), the 
third major statement of principles and policies adopted by the 
organization since its first Constitution in 1919.150 The ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice specifically addresses the problems 

147. Id. 
148 . International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 87) Concerning 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, July 9, 1948, 68 
U.N.T.S. 17.; International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 98) Concerning the 
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Bargaining Collectively, July 
1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257; International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 29) 
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55; 
International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of 
Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291. 
149 . See International Labour Organisation, Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-up art. 2, June 18, 1998 (Annex revised 
June 15, 2010) (“[A]ll Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in 
question, have an obligation . . . to promote and to realize, in good faith and in 
accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights 
which are the subject of those Conventions . . . .”). 
150. International Labour Organisation, Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization preface, Aug. 13, 2008 (“This is the third major statement of principles 
and policies adopted by the International Labour Conference since the ILO’s 
Constitution of 1919.”). 
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that globalization poses to workers’ rights.151 Specifically, the 
ILO Declaration on Social Justice recognizes how globalized 
economic integration fosters economic growth and increases 
employment rates, but at the same time nonetheless causes 
some countries to face major challenges relating to income 
inequality, poverty levels, and job security.152 
The ILO Declaration on Social Justice lays out four strategic 
objectives that require member states to develop and enhance 
labor protections within their borders to help realize 
fundamental workers’ rights more universally. 153  The ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice further provides that the ILO 
should provide assistance to member states wishing to 
incorporate the principles of the four objectives into a bilateral 
or multilateral agreement.154 The ILO Declaration on Social 
Justice encourages both the ILO and member states to 
cooperate with both MNCs and labor unions in order to further 
promote these four objectives.155 
2. The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. 
The ILO Declaration on Social Justice also reaffirms the 
policies stated in the Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (the 
“Tripartite Declaration”). 156  The principles in the Tripartite 
Declaration are intended to guide governments, employers, 
workers, and MNCs on how to act in accordance with the 

151. Id. (stating that the ILO Declaration on Social Justice was adopted to 
reaffirm ILO values within “the context of globalization.”). 
152. Id. at 5 (discussing how globalization has boosted some countries’ economies 
while simultaneously causing detrimental effects in other countries’ employment 
sectors). 
153. Id. art. I(A) (outlining the goals and purposes of the ILO Declaration on 
Social Justice’s strategic objectives). 
154. Id. art. II(A)(iv) (permitting member states to ask the ILO for assistance in 
creating a bilateral or multilateral agreement that fosters the achievement of the four 
objectives). 
155. Id. art. II(A)(v) (encouraging cooperation between states, MNCs, and labor 
unions to further realize the four strategic objectives). 
156. Id. 8 (listing the Tripartite Declaration and its objectives as having “particular 
relevance”). 
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principles espoused by the ILO.157 It recognizes that MNCs and 
their affiliated organizations could contribute to abusive 
workplace practices, either directly or indirectly.158 Thus, the 
Tripartite Declaration encourages MNCs to play a stronger role 
when it comes to ensuring that workers’ rights are respected, 
promoting economic and social welfare, and improving the 
living standards in other countries.159 
The Tripartite Declaration states that MNCs should respect 
the sovereign rights of each state, abide by national laws and 
regulations, give adequate consideration to local practices, and 
heed applicable international standards. 160  Specifically, the 
Tripartite Declaration encourages governments that have not 
yet ratified Convention Nos. 87 and 98 to do so.161 MNCs are 
encouraged to consult with relevant authorities and workers’ 
organizations in order to ensure that their operations do not 
violate that country’s social development policies.162 MNCs are 
expected to take steps to ameliorate their impact on the labor 
markets of other nations by providing stable employment and 
notifying the appropriate government authorities or workers’ 
representatives of any changes that would have major effects on 
employment rates.163 MNCs should not offer wages, benefits, or 
conditions that are less favorable than those offered by 

157. See International Labour Organisation, Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, para. 5, 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf.. 
158. Id. para. 1 (discussing how MNCs, through international direct investment, 
can either benefit a state or lead to unfair “concentrations of economic power” that 
could conflicts with the interests of workers). 
159. Id. (explaining that MNCs “can also make an important contribution to the 
promotion of economic and social welfare; to the improvement of living standards and 
the satisfaction of basic needs; to the creation of employment opportunities, both 
directly and indirectly; and to the enjoyment of basic human rights, including freedom 
of association, throughout the world”). 
160. Id. para. 8 (stating that MNCs should respect a state’s sovereignty, a state’s 
laws, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international frameworks 
promulgated by the ILO). 
161. Id. para. 9 (encouraging nations to ratify Convention Nos. 87 and 98). 
162. Id. para. 17 (stating that MNCs should try to ensure that their plans do not 
affect a nation’s social development policies). 
163 . Id. paras. 25–26 (stating that MNCs should try to maintain steady 
employment rates and notify relevant authorities if their actions affect employment 
rates). 
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comparable employers.164 If the MNC is operating in a country 
with no comparable employer, the MNC should provide wages, 
benefits, and conditions in accordance with relevant laws.165 
The Tripartite Declaration also states that workers in MNCs 
have the right to establish and join unions.166 The state must 
protect these unions against interferences from employers or 
other third parties.167 Further, governments are prohibited from 
offering special incentives to attract more FDI that would limit 
the workers’ freedom of association, right to organize, or right 
to collectively bargain.168 
F. Investments in the International Sphere. 
The international investment sphere has grown 
exponentially in the past few decades.169 Despite this boom in 
international investments, there is currently no existing global 
investment regulatory scheme. 170  Although some states and 
organizations attempted to initiate negotiations to form a 
multilateral agreement on investment (“MAI”), activists 
vehemently opposed this attempt, arguing that this type of 

164 . Id. para. 33 (“Wages, benefits and conditions of work offered by 
multinational enterprises should be not less favourable to the workers than those 
offered by comparable employers in the country concerned.”). 
165 . Id. para. 34 (“When multinational enterprises operate in developing 
countries, where comparable employers may not exist, they should provide the best 
possible wages, benefits and conditions of work, within the framework of government 
policies.”). 
166. Id. para. 42 (stating that workers employed by MNCs have the right to 
establish and join unions). 
167. Id. para. 43 (requiring states to adequately protect unions against possible 
interferences by employers or other parties). 
168. Id. para. 46 (prohibiting governments from lowering workers’ rights or 
standards in order to attract more investment). 
169. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 485 (“The frenetic rate of globalization has 
increased the number of MNCs, and consequently, the frequency of FDI and the use of 
BITs.”); see also Footer, supra note 20, at 36 (“In the past decade, there has been an 
explosion of BITs, and other forms of [international investment agreements] . . . .”). 
170. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 485 (“While two [World Trade Organization] 
agreements touch on trade-related investment they do not constitute comprehensive 
multilateral investment regulations . . . .”); see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & 
DEV., Multilateral Agreement on Investment, http://www.oecd.org/investment/
internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestment.htm 
[hereinafter OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment] (describing how, although 
negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investment were initiated, these 
negotiations ceased in April 1998). 
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instrument was essentially a “corporate bill of rights.”171 MAI 
negotiations ended fifteen years ago and have not yet 
resumed.172 
Despite the failure to create an MAI, investment between 
nations continues to grow, leading to an equally exponential 
boom in the formation of BITs.173 Generally, there are five major 
actors in a BIT.174 First, there is a host state, the state in which an 
MNC invests.175 Second, the home state is the state the MNC-
investor is incorporated.176 The third actors are the investors, 
which are usually MNCs but may be individuals.177 Fourth, there 
are the people or groups affected by the investment.178 Lastly, 
the fifth actor is the arbitration tribunal that helps resolve claims 
arising from a provision of a BIT.179 

171. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 486 (“Activists argued against the agreement, 
concerned that it would constitute a corporate bill of rights . . . .”); see also Multilateral 
Agreement On Investment, GLOBAL POL’Y F., http://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/
globalization-of-the-economy-2-1/multilateral-agreement-on-investment-2-5.html 
(reporting that negotiations for the MAI fell through due to fears that it would 
threaten state sovereignty and would lead to a “race to the bottom” situation). 
172 . See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, supra note 170 (stating that negotiations for an MAI ended in April 1998 
and will not resume); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 486 (explaining that 
negotiations for an MAI ended in April 1998 and have showed no signs of resuming). 
173. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 485 (describing how the growth of MNCs and 
FDI has led to the creation of more BITs); see also Footer, supra note 20, at 36 
(describing how the number of BITs has increased exponentially in the past decade). 
174. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (describing the actors involved in or 
affected by BITs); see also JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS 182–84 (2013) (stating that BITs 
generally involve investors and two states but can also have effects on local communities 
or peoples). 
175. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (“First, a ‘Host-State’ is the State-Party in 
which an investment exists.”); see also Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do 
BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 
46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 89 (2005) (using the term host country to describe the state in 
which an MNC invests). 
176. Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (“[A] ‘Home-State’ is the State of corporate 
citizenship of the investing MNC.”). 
177. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (stating that investors are the third actors 
involved in BIT proceedings); see also Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 175, at 75 (noting 
that an “impetus behind the rapid expansion of BITs rests in the desire of companies 
of industrialized states to invest safely and securely in developing countries”). 
178. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (“Fourth, impacted non-State actors are 
those people [or] groups that are affected by the actions or demands of the investing 
MNCs.”); see also RUGGIE, supra note 174, at 184 (describing how BITs can sometimes 
affect local communities). 
179. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (“Fifth, ‘arbitration tribunals’ serve as the 
dispute resolution mechanisms for disputes arising under a BIT.”); see also RUGGIE, 
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Under a BIT, the investor can directly bring a claim against 
the state in a private arbitration tribunal.180 Arbitration awards 
are binding on the parties and usually limited to money 
damages. 181  A leading international arbitration institution 
devoted to disputes arising between investors and a state is the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”).182 Under ICSID rules, a party initiates arbitration 
proceedings by submitting a request and memorials, documents 
containing a summary of the facts and laws applicable to the 
case, to the arbitration tribunal.183 After these documents are 
submitted, a hearing is held where either party may present 
witness or expert testimony and other types of evidence to the 
arbitration tribunal.184 Although disputes between investors and 
states are increasing, the exact number of arbitration cases 
resolved is unknown because the resolutions are usually kept 
private.185 

supra note 174, at 184 (describing how arbitration tribunals are involved in the BIT 
process). 
180. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 489 (stating that an “investor may bypass 
domestic court systems and bring a claim directly against the Host-State before an 
international arbitration tribunal”); see also RUGGIE, supra note 174, at 183 
(“[T]ypically a BIT permits the investor to initiate compulsory international arbitration 
claims against the state.”). 
181. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 490 (explaining how arbitration decisions are 
binding on the parties and usually limited to financial compensation); see also Stephan 
W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the 
People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 87–88 (2007) (explaining 
that an arbitration award is binding and enforceable). 
182. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 489 (“The leading international arbitration 
institution devoted to investor-State dispute settlement is the [ICSID].”); see also Schill, 
supra note 181, at 87–88 (“In standard international practice, investor-State arbitration 
is most often conducted under the rules of the [ICSID].”). 
183. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Convention, 
Regulations and Rules, rs. 30–31, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF-chap04.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (outlining the written 
procedures under ICSID rules and the process of transmitting a request). 
184. Id. rs. 32–33 (describing ICSID’s rules for the oral procedure aspect of an 
arbitration proceeding as well as for marshalling evidence). 
185. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 491 (“The exact number of investor-State 
arbitration cases [is] unknown because the initiation of the arbitration and their results 
are not always released publicly.”); see also Footer, supra note 20, at 63–64 (stating how, 
although there has been a move towards greater transparency in investment 
arbitration, “greater acceptance of non-disputing party rights in international 
investment arbitration is not yet universal”). 
1246 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1215 
Most states have a model BIT that serves as a template when 
states enter BIT negotiations.186 One provision found in most 
BITs is the “national treatment” provision that promises equal 
treatment for both in-state and out-of-state investors.187 Other 
provisions that model BITs commonly include are most-favored 
nation provisions, guaranteeing out-of-state investors from one 
state the same rights granted to investors from another state, 
and fair and equitable treatment provisions, which guarantee 
out-of-state investors minimum standards of treatment.188 Some 
BITs may contain risk-stabilization provisions that freeze 
regulatory regimes for the duration of a specific investment.189 
BITs may also contain “non-lowering of standards” provisions 
that prohibit states from derogating from labor standards in 
order to attract more investment from MNC-investors.190 For 
instance, the US Model BIT has two non-lowering of standards 
provisions, with one addressing environmental standards and 
the other relating to labor standards.191 Specifically, Article 13 of 

186. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 488 (“Most countries have a Model BIT which 
serves as a template and is typically used as a starting point to conduct negotiations of 
new BITs.”); see also Footer, supra note 20, at 36 (listing Canada, Norway, and the 
United States, among others, as states that have model BITs). 
187 . See Schill, supra note 181, at 93 (explaining that national treatment 
provisions are common in most BITs and require the host  state to not discriminate 
against out-of-state investors); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 488 (describing how 
BITs commonly contain national treatment provisions protecting investors against 
discriminatory treatment). 
188. See RUGGIE, supra note 174, at 182 (listing the rights that BITs commonly 
provide to investors); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 488 (describing how BITs 
commonly contain national treatment provisions, most-favored nation provisions, and 
fair and equitable treatment provisions). 
189. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 497 (explaining that risk-stabilization clauses 
can sometimes insulate investors from the need to obey certain new laws or 
regulations); see also RUGGIE, supra note 174, at 182 (discussing how some BITs contain 
provisions protecting out-of-state investors against new laws or regulations passed by the 
state). 
190. See Footer, supra note 20, at 43 (explaining that non-lowering of standards 
clauses help to “suppress the temptation of host states to lower their environmental or 
labour standards as an incentive to attract foreign investment”); see also RUGGIE, supra 
note 174, at 184–85 (discussing how non-lowering of standards provisions work). 
191.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, arts. 
12–13 (2012) [hereinafter US MODEL BIT], available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (prohibiting signatory 
states from lowering labor and environmental standards in order to draw in more FDI). 
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the US Model BIT prohibits signatory-states from lowering their 
labor standards in order to draw in more investments.192 
To summarize, the 1994 Labor Law and the changes to 
employment and labor laws during the 2000s form the basic 
framework governing the employer-employee relationship in 
China. Further, the Provisions supplement China’s labor laws by 
providing additional detail about collective negotiations and 
collective contracts. As a member of the ILO, labor standards in 
China must comply with the principles expressed in the ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice and the Tripartite Declaration. 
Lastly, the growth of the international investment sphere has led 
to the growth of BITs, instruments geared towards protecting 
the rights of investors investing in another state. 
II. HOW LABOR VIOLATIONS IN CHINA AND BITS’ INVESTOR-
ORIENTED APPROACH AFFECT WORKERS’ RIGHTS 
Despite the changes in China’s labor and employment laws 
during the 2000s, factories in China continue to use abusive 
labor practices that violate both state law and ILO labor 
standards. 193  These labor practices are more prevalent and 
pervasive in factories that manufacture products for or are in 
contract with MNCs.194 Part II.A first addresses how Chinese 
factories and companies continue to violate labor and 
employment laws. Part II.B discusses how, despite China’s labor 
laws, labor unions in China still fail to adequately protect 
workers’ rights and interests. Lastly, Part II.C discusses how the 

192. US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 13 (outlining the US Model BIT’s 
provisions on labor standards). 
193. See, e.g., Barboza, supra note 29 (“Nearly a decade after some of the most 
powerful companies in the world . . . began an effort to eliminate sweatshop labor 
conditions in Asia, worker abuse is still commonplace in many of the Chinese factories 
that supply Western companies . . . .”); see also Fresh Labor Violations in Chinese Factory 
Producing the “Cheap” iPhone, CHINA LAB. WATCH, Sept. 5, 2013, http://
www.chinalaborwatch.org/news/new-463.html (describing how factories in China 
continue to violate workers’ rights by failing to pay overtime wages, violating laws 
limiting overtime hours, and subjecting their workers to intense work conditions). 
194. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 1 (arguing that abusive 
labor practices are “firmly entrenched in the global supply-chain system”); see also 
Mattel’s Unceasing Abuse of Chinese Workers: An Investigation of Six Mattel Supplier Factories, 
CHINA LAB. WATCH 1 (2013), http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/2013.10.15-Mattel-
report.pdf [hereinafter Mattel’s Unceasing Abuse] (revealing how factories in China that 
produce products for MNCs reduce costs by lowering labor standards). 
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current BIT regime primarily protects the interests of MNC-
investors and not the interests of the state. 
A. Violations of Labor Standards or Laws Concerning Overtime, 
Adequate Wages, Child Labor, and Safe Working Conditions 
This Part addresses the labor abuses still practiced by 
factories in China. Part II.A.1 discusses how factories in China 
still violate legal limits on overtime. Part II.A.2 describes the 
inadequacy of wages paid to workers in China. Part II.A.3 
provides an overview of the dangerous, and sometimes deadly, 
factory work environments. Part II.A.4 describes the use of child 
labor by factories in contract with MNCs. Lastly, Part II.A.5 
discusses how employers use intermediaries in order to avoid 
complying with China’s labor and employment laws. 
1. Overtime Limit Violations 
China’s employment laws provide that workers shall not 
work for more than eight hours a day and no more than forty-
four hours per week. 195  Although these laws permit some 
companies to extend hours, they may do so only after seeking 
and receiving approval from the MLSS. 196  In regards to 
overtime, employees must not work more than thirty-six 
overtime hours per month.197 
Some organizations that investigated China’s factories 
discovered that actual overtime hours worked per month were 
not in compliance with the legally imposed limits.198 In some 
cases, the overtime hours exceeded the legal limit by over 
200%.199 China Labor Watch (“CLW”), an independent non-
governmental organization based in New York, investigated ten 

195. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, art. 36 (explaining China’s laws on work 
hours and overtime hours). 
196. Id. art. 39 (describing how employers may exempt themselves from work 
hour limits with the approval of the MLSS). 
197.  Id. art. 41 (stating that workers may not work more than thirty-six overtime 
hours per month). 
198. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 5 (reporting that some 
workers’ overtime hours went as high as 160 hours per month); see also Fresh Labor 
Violations in Chinese Factory Producing the “Cheap” iPhone, supra note 193 (reporting that 
at one factory, “110 hours of overtime per month is common”). 
199. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 5 (indicating that some 
workers worked a total of 160 overtime hours per month). 
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“global brand supplier electronics factories” from October 2010 
to June 2011.200 This report found that electronics factories had 
“notable sweatshop characteristics” including excessive overtime 
hours and maintaining extremely high levels of work intensity.201 
Further, some of these factories, in an effort to draw in more 
business from MNCs, compelled their employees periodically to 
work these excessive overtime hours.202 
2. Inadequate or Withheld Wage Payments 
China’s employment law specifies that a factory’s minimum 
wage must not be lower than the local minimum wage combined 
with the living expenses of the worker and those family members 
the worker supports.203 Employers may not withhold or embezzle 
wages without justification. 204  Employment law also requires 
workers to be paid 150% of their normal wage when working 
overtime hours.205 
The minimum wage for employees working in electronics 
factories frequently does not meet local minimum wage 
standards. 206  In some cases, workers have to take on extra 
overtime hours in order to break even.207 In other cases, workers 

200. Id. at 1 (detailing the logistics of their investigation). 
201 . Id. at 11 (describing how “[s]ome of the more notable sweatshop 
characteristics in Chinese electronics factories” include excessive overtime hours, 
extremely intensive workplace practices, and verbally attacking workers). 
202. Id. at 11–12 (discussing how supply-chain factories force workers to work 
“‘voluntary’ overtime” in order to increase profits); see also Swimming against the Tide, 
CHINA LABOUR BULL. 16 (2010), http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/File/research_
reports/Labour%20Conflict%20Report%20final.pdf (finding that factories contracting 
with MNCs force their employees to work overtime in order to meet target quotas). 
203. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, arts. 48–49 (stating that a worker’s wages 
should not be lower than local standards of minimum wages and should consider the 
living expenses of the worker and his family). 
204. Id. art. 50 (“The wages to be paid to labourers shall not be embezzled nor the 
payment thereof delayed without justification.”). 
205. Id. art. 44 (stating that employers shall pay “no less than 150 per cent of the 
normal wages if an extension of working hours is arranged”). 
206. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 5 (reporting that the 
minimum wage in some of these factories does not meet a worker’s living costs); see also 
Swimming against the Tide, supra note 202, at 17 (discussing how some companies paid 
less than the legal minimum wage). 
207. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 5 (“Workers cannot earn 
a living wage from normal working hours alone, and must work excessive overtime 
hours in order to earn enough money to survive.”); see also Swimming against the Tide, 
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did not earn enough because they were still owed either back 
pay or were not adequately compensated for working overtime 
hours.208 Further, some factories used wages as a punishment 
device by either withholding the wages arbitrarily or unfairly 
fining workers.209 
3. Unsafe Workplace Environments 
Employment law requires employers to provide workers 
with a safe work environment. 210  Further, employers are 
expected to train workers for tasks that require specialized 
training or qualifications to ensure workers’ safety.211 
Factories in China are notorious for exposing their workers 
to exceedingly dangerous or unhealthy working conditions.212 
One report in particular found that pneumoconiosis (a/k/a 
black lung disease), which has no cure, is one of the most 
prevalent occupational diseases in China.213 The report revealed 
that in 2010, black lung disease caused over 149,000 deaths and 

supra note 202, at 18 (stating that some workers had to work excessively long hours just 
to get CNY¥1417 per month, which equates to approximately US$227). 
208. See Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 202, at 18 (discussing how 14.4% of 
workers were owed back pay and 37.6% of workers had not been fully paid for working 
overtime hours); see also Mattel’s Unceasing Abuse, supra note 194, at 3 (reporting that 
some factories failed to pay workers in a timely manner or failed to pay them for 
overtime hours). 
209. See Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 202, at 19 (discussing how some 
employers withheld one and a half months’ worth of wages from workers to prevent 
them from quitting or leaving); see also Mattel’s Unceasing Abuse, supra note 194, at 4 
(discussing how one factory withholds wages from workers for checking their cell 
phones). 
210. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, art. 52 (stating that employers must establish 
workplace standards that meeting occupational safety and health standards). 
211. Id. art. 55 (“Labourers to be engaged in specialized operations must receive 
specialized training and acquire qualifications for such special operations.”). 
212 . See Time to Pay the Bill, CHINA LABOUR BULL. 4 (2013), http://
www.clb.org.hk/en/sites/default/files/File/research_reports/Time%20to%20Pay%
20the%20Bill.pdf (discussing how China’s government has ignored the epidemic of 
black lung disease running rampant through their workforce); see also TRAGEDIES OF 
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 110 (“More significantly, investigations revealed that 
for the majority of job posts in electronics factories, there is a high risk of contraction 
of occupational illnesses and diseases.”). 
213. See Time to Pay the Bill, supra note 212, at 4 (discussing the black lung disease 
epidemic among workers in China). 
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additionally infected over 500,000 persons.214 Further, in 2009 
over one hundred workers were poisoned from working with a 
dangerous chemical used to help clean iPhone touchscreens.215 
Some of these workers were hospitalized for up to nine months 
after the incident yet still suffer from “weak limbs and other 
health problems.” 216  In 2011, two factories in China that 
manufacture products for Apple exploded due to the build-up 
of aluminum dust in the factory area.217 At one of these factories, 
Apple’s inspectors were onsite just hours before the explosion 
occurred and spent a total of ten minutes examining the site.218 
Workers in some of the factories face conditions that could 
be physically debilitating or exhausting. The act of standing in 
an assembly line while repeating the same action “every three 
seconds . . . for ten consecutive hours”219 has caused some 

214. See id. (“The cumulative total, since the [Ministry of Health] started keeping 
records of pneumoconiosis in China in the 1950s, reached 676,541, with 149,110 
deaths and 527,431 people still suffering from the disease at the end of 2010.”). 
215. See Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 (“Two years ago, 137 workers at an Apple 
supplier in eastern China were injured after they were ordered to use a poisonous 
chemical to clean iPhone screens.”). 
216. See Apple and Foxconn Are Lying and Calling the Kettle Black, STUDENTS & 
SCHOLARS AGAINST CORP. MISBEHAVIOR (Mar. 18, 2012, 11:24 PM), http://sacom.hk/
apple-and-foxconn-are-lying-and-calling-the-kettle-black/ (reporting that many of the 
over one hundred workers poisoned from using a chemical to clean iPhones continue 
to suffer from health problems). 
217. See David Barboza, Explosion at Apple Supplier Caused by Dust, China Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/technology/
25foxconn.html?_r=0 (discussing how an explosion in a factory in China stemmed from 
combustible dust); see also John Brownlee, Both Foxconn iPad 2 Factories Exploded for the 
Same Reason, CULTOFMAC.COM (Dec. 20, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://www.cultofmac.com/
136398/both-foxconn-ipad-2-factories-exploded-for-the-same-reason/ (discussing how 
two explosions caused by a build-up of aluminum dust occurred in iPad factories in 
China within the span of one year). 
218. See Josh Ong, Apple Reportedly Performed Safety Inspections Hours Before 2011 
iPad Factory Blast, APPLE INSIDER (Mar. 13, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://appleinsider.com/
articles/12/03/13/apple_reportedly_performed_safety_inspections_hours_before_
2011_ipad_factory_blast (discussing how workers reported that Apple inspectors briefly 
examined one of its supply-chain factories in Shanghai just hours before the factory 
exploded); see also Charles Cooper, Injured Shanghai Workers Say Apple Visited Factory 
Hours Before Explosion, CNET (Mar. 12, 2012, 4:52 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13579_3-57395222-37/injured-shanghai-workers-say-apple-visited-factory-hours-before-
explosion (“Workers injured in a December blast at a Chinese factory say that Apple 
inspectors toured the facility hours before the accident.”). 
219. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 109 (“For example, on 
the HP production line, workers must complete an action every three seconds and 
repeat this for ten consecutive hours.”). 
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workers’ legs to “swell until they can hardly walk.”220 In one 
factory, workers have reportedly lost or broken about 40,000 
fingers while on the job every year.221 
4. The Use of Child Labor 
China has ratified ILO’s Convention Nos. 138 and 182, 
both of which prohibit the use of child labor.222 Despite this, 
MNCs like Wal-Mart and Disney have been accused of 
contracting with factories in China that use child labor to 
manufacture best-selling toy products.223 The use of child labor 
was also discovered in factories that produce electronic products 
for Apple and Samsung.224 In some cases, the children employed 
in these factories were as young as fourteen.225 
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220. See Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 (“Some say they stand so long that their 
legs swell until they can hardly walk.”). 
221. See Barboza, supra note 29 (reporting that “factory workers lose or break 
about 40,000 fingers on the job every year”). 
222 . International Labour Organisation, Convetion (No. 138) Concerning 
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment art. 1, June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 
(requiring member states to effectively abolish the use of child labor); International 
Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art. 1, June 17, 
1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (insisting that member states “take immediate and effective 
measure to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor as 
a matter of urgency.”). 
223. See David Barboza, Despite a Decade of Criticism, Worker Abuse Persists in China, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/business/
worldbusiness/04iht-sweatshop.4.9028448.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing how 
some factories that supply products to Wal-Mart, Dell, and Disney were accused of 
using child labor); see also Gethin Chamberlain, Disney Factory Faces Probe into Sweatshop 
Suicide Claims, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Aug. 27, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/law/2011/aug/27/disney-factory-sweatshop-suicide-claims 
(describing how Disney has recently been accused of using child labor to make one of 
its best-selling toys). 
224. See Juliette Garside, Child Labour Uncovered in Apple’s Supply Chain, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.) (Jan. 25, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/
25/apple-child-labour-supply (reporting that one company in China that produces 
products for Apple employed seventy-four children under the age of sixteen); see also 
Avram Piltch, Samsung Investigating Alleged Child Labor Abuse at Chinese Factory, YAHOO 
(Aug. 7, 2012, 12:51 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/samsung-investigating-alleged-child-
labor-abuse-chinese-factory-165148947.html (summarizing a report from CLW detailing 
how Chinese factories that manufacture products for Samsung uses child labor). 
225. See Piltch, supra note 224 (stating that some of the workers in the factory 
were as young as fourteen). 
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5. “Second-Class” Workers 
Non-compliance with employment laws is even more 
exacerbated when employers recruit workers through 
intermediaries. 226  China’s laws state that organizations and 
individuals are prohibited from using intermediaries as a way to 
bypass compliance with employment laws.227 For example, some 
employers hire dispatched workers and require them to work 
sixteen-hour days for less pay.228 Some employers bar dispatched 
workers from joining unions. 229  Further, intermediaries also 
treat their employees like second-class workers by requiring 
them to take on more work-intensive responsibilities in 
exchange for a lower wage and fewer benefits.230 
B. The Inadequacy of China’s Unions in Representing Workers’ 
Interests 
The ILO Declaration on Social Justice considers the 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining as 
indispensable to its four strategic objectives.231 The Tripartite 
Declaration also encourages governments to ratify Conventions 
87 and 98, which respectively recognize the right to freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining.232 
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226. See CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN, supra note 30, at 8–9 (finding 
that factories use dispatched workers to shift responsibility for worker injuries, prevent 
workers from unionizing, and to avoid limits on overtime); see also Roberts, supra note 
84 (discussing how employers are frequently using dispatched workers in order to avoid 
complying with employment laws). 
227. Employment Promotion Law, supra note 61, art. 39 (“All organizations and 
individuals are prohibited from infringing on the legitimate rights and interests of the 
workers by taking advantage of their intermediary activities for employment.”). 
228. See Roberts, supra note 84 (reporting that dispatched workers work long 
hours and are paid “three-quarters the wage earned” by other workers). 
229. See id. (reporting that dispatched workers at a factory that makes products for 
Nokio are not permitted to join the official union). 
230. See CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN, supra note 30, at 11 (stating 
that dispatched workers’ “wages are lower, their benefits are worse, and the intensity of 
their work is much greater”); see also Roberts, supra note 84 (finding that some 
dispatched workers are paid less and worked harder). 
231. See ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, supra note 150, 
at 11 (discussing how the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
are essential to achieving its four strategic objectives). 
232 . See ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, supra note 157, para. 9 (encouraging governments to 
adopt Convention Nos. 87 and 98). 
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The 2001 TUL requires labor unions to protect and 
advocate for workers’ rights and interests.233 China, however, 
represses the formation of any labor union outside of the 
government-endorsed national union—the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”).234 Since the ACFTU essentially 
operates under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 
(“CCP”), the union is expected to not only represent the best 
interests of the workers, but also to factor in the best interests of 
the state.235 For example, in accordance with China’s focus on 
maintaining a harmonious society, the ACFTU lacks the 
authority to organize or call for a strike.236 In fact, labor unions 
established under the ACFTU lack the power to initiate any sort 
of collective action and act primarily to control the actions of 
workers rather than to advocate their interests.237 
After a labor strike erupted in China in 2013, for instance, 
the ACFTU responded by only issuing statements of “concern 
and support.”238 Generally, workers in factories in the country 
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233. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text (detailing the provisions of 
the 2001 TUL). 
234. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 59 (arguing that “China’s failure to 
recognize freedom of association outside of the official union, the [ACFTU] and its 
continued repression of independent union organizing” remain problematic); see also 
Brown, supra note 124, at 51–52 (discussing how the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (“AFCTU”) has close ties to the Chinese Communist Party and continues to 
remain the “exclusive trade union in China”). 
235. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60 (“First, because all Chinese unions 
operate under the leadership of the Party, their primary allegiance is to state 
interests . . . .”); see also Brown, supra note 124, at 52 (discussing how the ACFTU must 
play a dual role and struggles between being more active in advocating and 
representing employees’ interests and being responsive to the state’s interest in 
maintaining social stability). 
236. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60–61 (discussing how unions in China lack 
the authority to initiate collective action); see also Biddulph, supra note 56, at 48 
(discussing how unions in China are “part of the institutional infrastructure 
constructed to preserve stability”). 
237. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60–61 (stating that unions generally lack the 
authority to initiate collective action or call a strike); see also Brown, supra note 124, at 
55 (noting the idea the “predominant function” of unions in China is to manage 
workers rather than to advocate for their rights). 
238. See Han Dongfang, Han Dongfang Discusses the Fast Emerging Labour Movement 
in China, CHINA LABOUR BULL., Sep. 6, 2013, http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/han-
dongfang-discusses-fast-emerging-labour-movement-china (reporting that the official 
union is “limited to issuing statements of concern and support” to workers after a 
recent strike occurred); see also Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 61 (stating that trade 
unions tend to “retreat where [a labor dispute] may lead to collective action”). 
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are unaware of the purpose of a union as well as of whether 
unions exist in their factory at all.239 Even in cases where a 
worker is aware of the existence of a union, the worker harbors 
serious doubts about the union’s ability to act as an effective 
advocate for workers’ rights.240 
C. BITs and How They Favor MNC Investors Over States and People 
The decision to negotiate a US-China BIT was met with 
mixed reactions. 241  Some responded to these negotiations 
positively, noting that a BIT between two of the world’s largest 
economies would not only help protect the flow of FDI between 
the United States and China but further would improve global 
economics overall.242 Others have been more hesitant, warning 
that a quickly hashed out deal between the United States and 
China could have serious repercussions in the environmental, 
investment, and labor fields. 243  Notably, the American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(“AFL-CIO”), the largest federation of labor unions in the 
United States, opposed the revival of a US-China BIT because 
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239. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60 (describing how workers were unaware of 
the purpose or relevance of unions); see also CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN, 
supra note 30, at 7 (“Most workers are not familiar with unions and their functions.”). 
240. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60 (discussing how workers generally view 
unions as “irrelevant as a source of effective representation”); see also Brown, supra note 
124, at 55 (describing how the understanding of labor unions as a vehicle for 
enhancing workers’ rights is an unorthodox, even unfamiliar concept in China). 
241. Compare Bourassa, supra note 26 (stating that a US-China BIT is beneficial for 
the United States, China, and the global economy), with Celeste Drake, A BIT With 
China Is the Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem, AFL-CIO NOW (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-Legislation/A-BIT-with-China-Is-the-
Wrong-Solution-to-the-Wrong-Problem (warning that a BIT between the United States 
and China “is likely to cause further harm to U.S.-based producers and America’s 
working families”). 
242. See EVALUATING A POTENTIAL US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: 
BACKGROUND, CONTEXT, AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 27, at 43 (discussing how a US-
China BIT could be positive and increase the flow of investment between the two 
states); see also Bourassa, supra note 26 (“A BIT between the world’s two largest 
economies . . . will not only be good for the United States and China, but also for the 
global economy.”). 
243. See Sarah Anderson, Memo to US: Only Fools Rush In, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (March 
21, 2010, 11:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/
mar/18/china-usforeignpolicy (stating that a BIT may give investors too much power 
vis-a-vis the state); see also Drake, supra note 241 (arguing that the move to create a BIT 
with China may make it “exacerbate, rather than improve labor abuses in China”). 
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BITs have historically provided inadequate protections for 
workers’ rights.244 Specifically, the AFL-CIO argues that the US 
Model BIT fails to “effectively protect fundamental labor rights,” 
which may make it easier for MNCs in China to further 
aggravate existing labor abuses.245 
Further, BITs are primarily investor-oriented instruments in 
that they were devised to give MNCs an avenue through which to 
initiate arbitration proceedings against a state.246 The framework 
for existing BITs also grants investors stronger rights and 
protections in relation to a state.247 For example, the US Model 
BIT contains a most-favored-nation clause that promises 
investors “treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investors of any non-Party.”248 In other words, 
under this clause an investor could claim greater rights than the 
ones agreed to by the state-parties.249 Some investors have used 
BITs to hold host states economically liable for any depreciation 
in the value of their investment, even in cases where an 
arbitration proceeding could impair the provision of public 
services like water, sewage management, electricity, waste, oil, 
and mining.250 
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244. See Drake, supra note 241 (discussing how a US-China BIT would impair 
workers rights because of the inadequate protections provided by BITs). 
245. Id. (opposing a US-China BIT because the current US Model BIT provides 
ineffective protection for workers’ rights). 
246. See Schill, supra note 181, at 87 (“[M]ost BITs provide the covered investors 
with a unilateral right to initiate arbitral proceedings against the host country . . . .”); 
see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 489 (describing how most BIT disputes are initiated by 
investors against states). 
247. See Dr. Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A 
Critique, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 131, 147 (2013) (describing how BITs give out-of-state 
investors greater rights in relation to in-state investors that could affect or limit the 
regulatory authority of a state); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 488 (detailing different 
provisions in BITs that provide strongly protect investors’ interests). 
248. US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 4 (outlining the specifics of the US 
Model BIT’s most-favored-nation clause). 
249. See id. 
250. See Ofodile, supra note 247, at 148 (“Specifically, there are concerns that 
‘[s]ome investors are using bilateral investment treaties to challenge treatment of 
foreign investments in various sensitive areas, including water and sewage provisions, 
oil and gas exploitation and mining concessions.’”); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 
496 (“According to a 2007 study of concluded and pending ICSID cases, the majority of 
cases involved either basic public services or energy resources: 42 percent involved 
water, electricity, telecoms, and waste management, and 29 percent involved oil, gas, 
and mining.”). 
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In Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. Mexico, for example, 
an MNC-investor initiated arbitration proceedings against 
Mexico, claiming that the state’s refusal to renew its landfill 
license was an illegal expropriation that violated an 
international investment agreement.251 Mexico refused to renew 
the license because the investor was storing excessive amounts of 
waste, some of which were hazardous, within the landfill.252 
Although Mexico argued that their refusal was an exercise of the 
state’s policing power “within the highly regulated and 
extremely sensitive framework of environmental protection and 
public health,” ICSID ordered the state to pay the MNC-investor 
$5 million.253 
The state of Tanzania went into arbitration for violating a 
BIT provision after unilaterally terminating a water privatization 
contract with an MNC-investor. 254 Six non-governmental 
organizations filed a petition requesting to be granted amicus 
curiae status in the arbitration proceedings, arguing that any 
decision rendered by the ICSID tribunal critically affects 
Tanzania’s local communities and their access to safe drinking 
water. 255  More recently, a Hong Kong-based MNC initiated 
arbitration proceedings possibly worth billions of US dollars 
against Australia, challenging the state’s authority to pass new 
laws designed to discourage people from smoking.256  These 
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251. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. The United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 95–96 (May 29, 2003) (summarizing the 
expropriation claims raised by the investor in the arbitration proceeding). 
252. Id. ¶¶ 97–99 (summarizing the defense arguments raised by the state during 
arbitration).  
253. Id. ¶¶ 97, 201. 
254. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 1, ¶¶ 1–13 (Mar. 31, 2006) (providing 
background information on the dispute between Biwater Gauff and Tanzania). 
255. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22, Petition for Amicus Curiae Status, 7–8 (Nov. 27, 2006) (arguing that 
this arbitration “goes far beyond merely resolving commercial or private conflicts, but 
rather has a substantial influence on . . . basic human rights.”). 
256. See Rob Taylor, Philip Morris Challenges Australia on Plain Pack, REUTERS (Nov. 
20, 2011, 11:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/us-australia-
smoking-idUSTRE7AK09H20111121 (reporting that Philip Morris initiated arbitration 
proceedings against Australia, challenging the country’s new laws regulating tobacco 
products); see also Investor-state Arbitration–Tobacco Plain Packaging, AUSTL. GOV’T ATT’Y-
GEN.’S DEP’T, http://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) 
(summarizing the developments of the arbitration proceedings between Australia and 
Philip Morris). 
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cases show how MNC-investors have used BIT provisions to 
challenge a state’s regulatory or policing power, even when the 
state is acting in areas pertaining to health or the environment. 
The use of private arbitration is also problematic because, 
since cases are decided on an ad hoc basis, this leads to 
uncertainty over what an MNC’s obligations are in relation to a 
host state.257 The arbitrators used in these arbitrations have also 
been criticized for being primarily investment-oriented and 
inexperienced in the human rights area.258 This bias in favor of 
investors is made worse by the fact that some arbitrators have 
acted or later will act as legal counsel for the investors involved 
in the dispute.259 
Even in cases where a BIT does mention labor standards, it 
does so using “preambular language.” 260  In other words, 
although some BITs encourage states and MNCs to respect 
workers’ rights, they impose no penalties or sanctions against 
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257. See Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights 24 
(INEF Research Paper Series 03/2010), available at http://www.humanrights-
business.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf 
(describing how arbitrations brought under a BIT pose problems because of the 
“irregularities and legal uncertainty” inherent in arbitration proceedings); see also 
Sheffer, supra note 19, at 490 (discussing how, because arbitration decisions only bind 
the parties, they fail to create a uniform standard of conduct among MNCs). 
258. See Jacob, supra note 257, at 25 (“Most arbitrators that are selected by the 
parties have commercial backgrounds and do not regularly deal with matters 
pertaining to human rights law . . . .”); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 495 (describing 
how arbitrators are required to have commercial and legal experience yet are usually 
not familiar with human rights-related laws). 
259. See Jacob, supra note 257, at 25-26 (discussing how arbitrators may be self-
serving because they “frequently also act as counsel to parties in other cases”); see also 
Drake, supra note 241 (arguing that arbitrators may be biased because the attorneys 
who from the panels come from work in large, international law firms and, as such, are 
“mouthpieces for global investors”). 
260. See Jacob, supra note 257, at 11 (classifying BIT language addressing labor or 
environmental standards as “preambular language”); see also Vid Prislan & Ruben 
Zandvliet, Perspectives on Topical Foreign Direct investment issues by the Vale Columbia Center 
on Sustainable International Investment, COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES (April 1, 2013), 
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/labor-provisions-bilateral-investment-treaties-
does-new-us-model-bit-provide-template-future#_ftn1 (“The amendments to the 2012 
Model represent a small but welcome step in bridging the divide between investment 
law and public policy concerns . . . [b]ut it lacks a clear obligation to adopt and 
maintain ILO standards as a minimum, and does not allow disputes to be submitted to 
arbitration.”). 
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these entities should a violation occur.261 For example, the US 
Model BIT does not permit a state or an investor to bring 
arbitrations claims under Article 13, the BIT’s sole provision that 
addresses the significance of workers’ rights.262 If an issue arises 
under Article 13, a party may only make a request for a 
consultation meeting.263 
The combination of China’s lax enforcement of labor and 
employment laws, and BITs strong protections for investors, 
both weigh against the rights of workers. Despite China’s 
implementation of new labor and employment laws, widespread 
abusive labor practices continue to persist. Further, unions are 
constrained in their ability to adequately represent workers’ 
rights. Lastly, BITs and their focus on protecting the value of 
FDI from MNC-investors can sometimes constrict a state’s 
regulatory authority, making it more difficult for states to pass 
new regulations or laws that to protect workers. 
III. USING THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK 
AS A TOOL TO AFFIRMATIVELY HOLD MNCS LIABLE FOR 
EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Viewing BITs through a purely commercial lens ignores the 
possibly detrimental effects that international investments may 
have on a government’s regulatory authority and local 
communities.264 The simple act of investing in another country 
can create intimate ties between the signatory-states as well as 
between the MNCs and the people in the state.265 Thus, even 
though Apple may not be legally liable for labor violations 
occurring within their supply-chain factories in China, this does 
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261. See US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 24 (permitting claims to be brought 
under provisions that are more investor-oriented and barring claims from being 
brought under provisions pertaining to labor or environmental standards). 
262. Id. art. 24(a) (permitting claimants to submit an arbitration claim only if an 
obligation under Articles 3 through 10 was breached). 
263. Id. art. 13(4) (permitting a party to request a consultation should a “matter” 
arise under Article 13). 
264. See supra notes 19–25, 241–263 and accompanying text (detailing instances in 
which MNCs have used BITs to protect their financial interests even if it constrains the 
state’s ability to regulate in the health, environmental, or other areas). 
265. See supra notes 251–255 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which an 
MNC-investor’s arbitration suit against the state affected a communities’ access to safe 
water or damaged the environment). 
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necessarily mean that Apple is entirely blameless. BITs can serve 
as the connective bridge between the commercial sphere and 
the human rights sphere, ensuring that there is an avenue 
through which to hold MNCs legally liable for permitting or 
blatantly ignoring the use of abusive labor practices. 
Part III.A argues that clauses can easily be strengthened in 
existing model BITs to provide greater protections for workers’ 
rights. Next, Part III.B argues that incorporating stronger 
clauses for labor standards levels the playing field between 
investors and states in a BIT arbitration. Lastly, Part III.C argues 
that BITs are a practical and effective way to ensure that MNCs 
respect and protect labor rights, regardless of where these labor 
violations occur. 
A. Changing the Language of BITS to Address and Protect the State’s 
Right and Obligation to Protect Workers 
The US Model BIT fails to include provisions that give 
parties the right to bring arbitration claims against a state or 
investor for violating a worker’s rights.266 Further, the US Model 
BIT does not have provisions immunizing a state from liability 
should the state pass new laws or policies that further protects 
workers’ rights and interests.267 
The US Model BIT already has provisions that protect states 
from being subjected to arbitration proceedings for passing 
regulations pertaining to environmental concerns.268 Further, 
the US Model BIT contains provisions protecting the state’s 
right to act in matters relating to financial stability.269 Article 20 
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266. See supra notes 260–263 and accompanying text (describing the provisions in 
the US Model BIT that briefly address labor rights). 
267. See supra notes 260–263 and accompanying text (describing the US Model 
BIT’s labor provisions). 
268. US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 12. (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investing activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental 
concerns.”). 
269 . US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 20 (“Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this Treaty, a Party shall not be prevented from adopting or maintaining 
measures relating to financial services for prudential reasons, including for the 
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial services supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system.”). 
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provides that a state-party “shall not be prevented from adopting 
or maintaining measures relating to . . . the integrity and 
stability of the financial system.”270 In other words, both these 
provisions protect a state’s right to pass new laws or regulations 
about the environment or the financial sector by shielding them 
from incurring liability to an investor under a BIT. 
A US-China BIT should include similar language pertaining 
to labor rights. Specifically, a US-China BIT should place 
affirmative obligations on MNCs and states to respect workers’ 
rights as well as safeguard a state’s authority to pass new 
employment laws or regulations. Further, these provisions 
should grant investors and states the option to bring arbitration 
claims in cases where a labor violation does occur. 
B. Incorporating Labor Standards into BITs Will Even the Playing 
Field Between the State and MNC-Investors 
The current international investment regime is biased 
towards protecting investors without providing equally strong 
provisions safeguarding a state’s power to regulate.271 Currently, 
many standard BITs include investor-oriented clauses such as 
national treatment provisions, fair and equitable treatment 
provisions, and expropriation provisions. 272  These clauses 
guarantee that an investor’s rights are protected against 
arbitrary or discriminatory treatment at the hands of a state.273 
Further, arbitrators in BIT arbitrations are only expected to be 
experts in the commercial area.274 These favorable provisions for 
investors have made it easier to essentially freeze states from 
passing any new measures relating to regulating the 
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270. See id. 
271. Compare supra notes 174–192 and accompanying text (describing how BITs 
contain provisions protecting investor’s rights and granting them minimum 
protections), with supra notes 241–263 (discussing how MNC-investors have used BITs 
hold states liable for any depreciation in an investment’s value). 
272 . See supra notes 174–192 and accompanying text (outlining how BIT 
provisions protect investors). 
273. See supra notes 174–192 and accompanying text 
274. See supra notes 257–259 and accompanying text (discussing how arbitrators 
in BIT arbitrations usually come from the investment sphere). 
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environment, labor standards, or other areas of public interest 
out of fear of being forced to pay enormous an arbitral award.275 
Including stronger state-oriented clauses in BITs that 
protect a state’s authority to regulate can help correct this 
imbalance. Some BITs already have provisions relating to areas 
of public interest, like protecting the stability of financial 
institutions or preserving the environment. 276  Strengthening 
provisions relating to labor standards will not, as some might say, 
be “counterproductive” to trade policy by “inhibit[ing] 
countries like China . . . from actually concluding bilateral 
investment treaties with the United States.” 277  Instead, it 
provides states with more bargaining power against MNC 
investors in the international investment game and gives states 
the flexibility needed to regulate in sensitive public interest 
areas. 
C. The Practicality of Including Mandatory Obligations in BITs 
Requiring MNCs to Respect Worker’s Rights 
China already has a history of turning a blind-eye to the 
abusive labor practices used in some of their factories.278 China 
has attempted to ameliorate these practices through changing 
their labor and employment laws, but these changes are more 
easily made on paper rather than in practice.279 Further, the 
ACFTU remains mostly ineffectual when it comes to 
encouraging workers to engage in collective action or bringing 
about any substantive change.280 
Embedding labor standards into BITs may be more 
practicable and feasible than advocating for more widespread 
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275. See supra notes 21–25, 251–256 and accompanying text (describing how 
MNC-investors have brought claims valued at millions of dollars against states). 
276. US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, arts. 12, 20 (stating that a state’s right to pass 
laws regulating environmental standards or the financial sector is protected). 
277. Doug Palmer, U.S. Resolves 3-year Debate on Investment Treaty Terms, CHI. TRIB., 
April 20, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-20/news/sns-rt-us-usa-
investment-treatiesbre83j15l-20120420_1_treaties-foreign-investment-labor-groups. 
278 . See supra notes 195–240 and accompanying text (detailing the labor 
violations and abuses that occur in China’s factories and workplaces). 
279. Compare supra notes 56–140 and accompanying text (describing the changes 
to China’s labor and employment laws made in the 2000s), with supra notes 195–240 
(detailing the labor violations and abuses that continue to occur in China’s factories). 
280. See supra note 231–240 and accompanying text (discussing the limits on the 
ACFTU to represent workers’ rights). 
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changes in China’s labor policies. 281  Considering China’s 
prohibition on the establishment of any independent trade 
union outside of the ACFTU, it is difficult for any real and 
adequate worker representation to occur. 282  Including non-
derogation labor provisions in BITs, however, subtly integrates 
stronger labor standards into China from without its borders. 
Further, facing possible arbitration proceedings and the threat 
of an excessive arbitral award could further motivate the state to 
raise their labor standards. 283  Most significantly, including 
provisions in a BIT requiring states to not derogate from 
international labor standards provides MNCs and states a basis 
from which to file an arbitration claim. As an illustration, during 
the Apple-Foxconn scandal, Apple could have initiated 
arbitration proceedings against China for permitting these labor 
violations to occur in their supply-chain factories. Although 
Apple may only be able to recover monetary damages, of the two 
actors who should be held accountable for the scandal, this 
method at least holds one of them liable. This example also 
works when switched: a state may initiate an arbitration 
proceeding against a, MNC-investor for investing into factories 
that have violated relevant labor or employment laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Increasing globalization combined with the strict 
compartmentalization of issues into commercial and non-
commercial areas have complicated the interactions between 
investments and human rights. The current international 
investment regime, spearheaded by MNCs, can no longer cling 
to their myopic blinders that focus purely on matters of 
economics, finance, and profit. In the end, the increasing 
number of BITs will inevitably increase the flow of FDI between 
states and MNCs. This will further blur the line demarcating 
where state liability ends and where MNC responsibility begins. 
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281. See supra notes 195–230 and accompanying text (describing how, despite the 
changes in China’s employment laws, abusive labor practices continue to pervade 
Chinese factories). 
282. See supra notes 231–240 and accompanying text (describing the ACFTU). 
283. See supra notes 19–25, 251–256 and accompanying text (discussing cases 
where investors brought arbitration proceedings against states and were awarded 
enormous arbitral awards). 
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Including stronger labor rights-oriented provisions in a US-
China BIT can provide a preemptive answer to these future 
issues. BITs can help establish a governing code of conduct that 
legally and financially binds the actions of states and MNCs as 
well as the actions of their affiliates. 
Additionally, MNCs and their increasingly global activities 
make it more difficult to regulate them uniformly across all state 
lines. Like the Multilateral Agreement on Investments and its 
subsequent failure, an effort to create some sort of universal, 
standardized document establishing standards of conduct for all 
MNCs operating in any jurisdiction may prove impossible. Yet, 
similar to how the international investment sphere developed, 
the creation of widely recognized standards on corporate social 
responsibility for MNCs can advance on a bilateral basis. 
Although it may be slow to have this movement proceed treaty 
by treaty, this method provides room for experimentation while 
simultaneously giving proper respect to each state’s individual 
and unique characteristics. 
